DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 191 751 SO 012 564

TITLE	Food First Resource Guide: Documentation on the Roots of World Hunger and Rural Poverty.
INSTITUTION	Institute for Food and Development Policy, San Francisco, Calif.
PUB DATE	79
NOTE	81p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Institute for Food and Development Policy, 2588 Mission St., San Francisco, CA 94110 ($3.00, quantity discounts available).
EDRS PRICE	MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS	Agricultural Production: Community Education: Cooperative Planning: Curriculum Development: Developed Nations: Developing Nations: Economic Development: *Food: Global Approach: Higher Education: Opinion Papers: Overpopulation: Political Power: Postsecondary Education: *Poverty: Resource Materials: *Rural Development: Secondary Education: *Socioeconomic Influences: *World Problems

ABSTRACT

This guide reviews resources used to develop the analysis of world hunger in "Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity," Houghton Mifflin, 1977. The objectives are to help people understand the economic and political factors that contribute to food deprivation, document this analysis with credible sources, and inform high school, college, and community study teachers about the existence and availability of various resources on global hunger. The developers believe that the guide might also aid teachers as they develop curriculum on world poverty. The guide is presented in four sections. Sections I and II focus on the causes of hunger. Topics discussed include population, scarcity, production, colonialism, inequality among and within nations, sexism, racism, and inefficiency. Sections III and IV discuss proposed solutions including agribusiness, economic and military intervention, international aid, socialist reforms, and the responsibility of Americans in ending world hunger. Citations of books, articles, studies, and reports are listed immediately under the topic to which they refer within each section. For each entry, information is given on title, author, publisher, date of publication, code designating the type of data to be found in the cited material, and (where appropriate) chapter and/or page. The document concludes with a directory of organizations and publications cited in the guide. (DE)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED191751

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Annie Newman

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

FOOD FIRST RESOURCE GUIDE

Documentation on the Roots of World Hunger and Rural Poverty

SO 012 564

The Staff of the Institute
for Food and Development Policy

© 1979 Institute for Food and Development Policy
Please contact the Institute for permission
to reprint all or part of this publication.

To order additional copies of this booklet:

1 to 6 copies $3.00
7 to 49 copies $2.25
50 or more copies $1.80

Add 10% of total for postage and handling.
Make checks payable to:
The Institute for Food and Development Policy
2588 Mission Street
San Francisco, California 94110

The text for this booklet was set in 10 point Palatino.
Design and production: Barbara Garza
Typesetting: Sherrell Graphics
Printing: Riteway-Haluska Printers

Contents

I.
The Cause of Hunger is Not Scarcity, Not Overpopulation

Current Supply 7
Productive Capacity 8
Population: Problem, Not Cause 9

II.
The Cause of Hunger is the Inequality in Control Over Food Producing Resources

The Colonial Inheritance: Roots in Modern Inequalities 14
Inequalities Between Nations Today 19
Inequalities Within Nations 23
Inequalities Based in Sexism 25
Inequalities Based in Racism 28
The Inefficiency of Inequality 29

III.
The Solution is Not Technology, Nor Agribusiness, Nor Official Foreign Assistance

The Narrow Production Focus 35
Agribusiness 40
Non-"Aid" Forms of Economic and Military Intervention 47
Food Aid, A.I.D. and the World Bank 49

IV.
The Solution Lies in the Transformation Of Control Over the Resources That Produce Food

Lessons From Societies Eliminating Hunger 60
The Responsibility of Americans 68

Appendix 70
Publications/Organizations 74
Institute Publications 77

This guide is a response to the question many people have asked about what sources we used to develop the analysis in *Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity* (Houghton Mifflin, 1977; Ballantine Books paperback, September, 1979) and in our other publications. Several types of potential users of this guide have been kept in mind:

1. Those seeking for the first time to grasp the economic and political forces that help to generate food deprivation. For this group of newcomers to the issues, we hope this guided tour through the resources will lay out the broad historical forces that must be taken into account. We hope it will lead to a desire to read for themselves many of the sources highlighted.

2. Those who have been exposed to a "radical" analysis of the "hunger problem" but dismiss it, at least in part, because of the belief that it is not documented or documentable. Thus, especially for this group, we include sources that have broad credibility (United Nations; International Labour Office; accepted scholars, etc.).

3. Teachers and other group study leaders who would be unlikely to know of the availability of many of the sources cited. The organization of topics in the guide might also be useful to teachers in planning syllabuses.

The resource guide format is somewhat unorthodox; it is not simply a list of resources, but outlines the roots of food insecurity and deprivation with emphasis on the sources used in arriving at

such an analysis. The guide is divided into four sections: the first two sections focus on the causes of hunger; sections three and four discuss proposed solutions. Within each section you will find citations of various books, articles, studies, and reports. Most materials currently not available in English have not been included.

Two asterisks next to a citation denotes a source that puts forward the same thesis as what is stated immediately above the asterisks. One asterisk denotes a source containing data from which the conclusions above it have been drawn.

References to parts and sections of hardback edition of *Food First* (Houghton Mifflin) are denoted with (hb). The paperback edition (Ballantine Books) is cited with (pb).

Many of the publications and studies in this guide are hard to find in a local library, but can be purchased from the institution which published them. Therefore we have included an appendix which lists most of the names and addresses of the institutions cited in our sources.

In addition to this guide, the Institute has created a 30-minute slide show with an accompanying study guide based upon the analyses and information contained in *Food First.* The slide show and study guide will be available in July 1979 and can be purchased directly from the Institute. (It is also available as a filmstrip.)

We also will be publishing a guide for people asking "what can we do to eradicate world hunger?" This action guide, tentatively scheduled for publication in the fall of 1979, will examine the diverse ways groups and individuals are taking action to confront the issues of hunger and concentrated control over food resources.

We welcome your suggestions and criticisms about our publications and projects.

The Staff
Institute for Food and Development Policy
May, 1979

Women harvesting rice in Senegal. *World Bank photo by Roy Witlin.*

PART I

The Cause of Hunger is Not Scarcity, Not Overpopulation

Hunger is caused by neither the absolute scarcity of food nor the resources with which to produce more. Hunger exists in the face of abundance; therein lies the outrage.

CURRENT SUPPLY

1. Global grain production is adequate to feed all.

Enough is produced now to provide everyone on earth with more than two pounds of grain per day, equivalent to about 3,000 calories—about what the average American consumes. And this estimate does not include the many other foods—beans, vegetables, nuts, fruits, etc.—produced in vast quantities.

$$\frac{\text{World Cereals Production (1,477,348,000 metric tons)}}{\text{World Population (4,043,320,000 people)}} = \text{2.19 lb/day/person (3000+ calories) and ample protein}$$

* Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) *Production Yearbook*, 1976.

2. Even in "basketcase" countries, enough grain is produced.

In Bangladesh, one of the world's most densely populated countries, enough grain is produced to theoretically provide each person with about 2600 calories per day—minimal but adequate. Yet over half of the people suffer from malnutrition. And in India today, 20 million tons of "surplus" grain must be guarded by soldiers while chronic hunger continues.

* *FAO Production Yearbook*, 1976.

** Frances Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins with Cary Fowler, *Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity*, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1977; Ballantine, 1979, Chapter 1 and 2 (See description at the end of this booklet).

** Colin Tudge, *The Famine Business*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977.

* India "surplus" estimate from Mahbub ul Haq, head of Policy Planning at the World Bank.

PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY

Productive capacity in the underdeveloped countries that could be meeting basic food needs remains untapped or misused.

1. **Land is significantly underused.**

   Authoritative reports estimate that only less than half of the potentially cultivated land in the world is currently being cultivated.

   ** *The World Food Problem*, A Report of the President's Science Advisory Committee. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1966.

   ** Supporting Papers, World Food and Nutrition Study, National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 2, Washington, D.C. 1977 (2101 Constitution Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20418).

2. **Production in underdeveloped countries remains well below that proven possible.**

   Average yields in the underdeveloped countries are only half those of the industrial countries. If yields in countries like Bangladesh or India matched those of comparable rice growing areas of Taiwan or Japan, their production would increase 3 to 4 fold. The constraints are not physical: Bangladesh, for example, has some of the world's richest alluvial soils and abundant water for irrigation. But only 12 percent of the land benefits from irrigation. (The economic and political constraints that result in such underutilization are discussed in Part II, p. 23-33 ff.)

   ** *FAO Production Yearbook* comparisons of current yields).

   ** Betsy Hartmann and James Boyce, *Needless Hunger: Voices from a Bangladesh Village*, San Francisco, CA: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1979. Based on two years of experience in Bangladesh, and nine months in a single village, the authors show how elite control over resources leads to not only an unequal sharing but also gross underutilization of resources.

   * Edgar Owens and Robert Shaw, *Development Reconsidered*, Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1974.

   Sizing up the potential of Bangladesh to grow food, a 1976 report to Congress concluded, "The country is rich enough in fertile land, water, manpower, and natural gas for fertilizer, not only to be self-sufficient in food, but a food exporter, even with its rapidly increasing population size."

   ** *World Hunger, Health, and Refugee Problems*, summary of a Special Study Mission to Asia and the Middle East. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 99.

   ** See *Food First*, Chapter 1.

3. Misutilization of resources leads to the illusion of scarcity.

Where the majority of people are too poor to make their basic needs felt in the marketplace, the food-producing resources serve those who can pay—the privileged elite within the country and higher paying foreign markets. Thus food-producing resources that could be feeding hungry people are misused for the already adequately fed.

The Caribbean. While as many as 80 percent of the children are undernourished, about 44 percent of the land, invariably the best land, is used to grow just four export crops: coffee, bananas, cocoa, and sugar cane, which serve to enrich a small domestic elite.

** *FAO Production Yearbook.*

** See *Food First* Chapter 6(hb), Chapter 7(pb) for a discussion of why the serious environmental devastation in Haiti, Central America, the Sahel, and the Amazon Basin are not due to "overpopulation."

The Sahel. Agricultural exports actually increased from the Sahelian countries in Africa during the late 1960s and early seventies in the face of worsening drought and hunger.

** *FAO Production Yearbooks.*

* Michael Lofchie, "Political and Economic Origins of African Hunger," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Dec. 1975, pp 551-67.

** Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, *The Political Economy of Ecological Destruction: Development in the West African Sahel.* Montclair, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1979. Based on recent extensive research as part of the World Agricultural Research Project of the Harvard School of Public Health, the authors argue that the Sahel region could have supported its population during the drought of the early 70's and that the famine was the result of specific economic structures and policies.

Mexico. More basic grains are consumed by livestock than by the country's peasants.

** Alan Riding, quoting the head of the National Institute of Nutrition in Mexico, *The New York Times*, March 6, 1978.

For a general discussion on livestock and land in Mexico see:

** Ernest Feder, "The Odious Competition Between Man and Animal Over Agricultural Resources in the Underdeveloped Countries," paper to be published from Berghof Stiftung fur Konfliktforschung, FU, Berlin.

POPULATION: Problem, Not Cause

1. Hunger is NOT caused by overpopulation.

To prove that hunger is caused by too many people, it would be necessary to demonstrate a correlation between the density of

people and degree of hunger. Such a correlation does not exist:

–France has the same number of people per cropped acre as India.

–China, where hunger has been eradicated in only 25 years, has twice as many people per cropped acre as India. (China feeds four times the population of the United States on less cultivated acreage.)

–The famine-prone Sahelian countries in Africa have 2½ acres of cultivated land per person, as much as the United States.

** *FAO Production Yearbook*, 1977.

** See *Food First*, Part II (hb); Part I (pb).

2. A cause of hunger is said to be rural unemployment caused by too many people, but in most cases there are not too many people to be productively employed.

Agriculturally productive countries in Asia without a hunger problem such as Japan employ twice as many workers per acre as countries with low productivity and much hunger such as India or the Philippines. If such countries could attain the agricultural labor intensity of Japan (2 workers per hectare or 2.5 acres), their agriculture could absorb all the labor force expected by 1985.

** *The World Bank, The Assault on World Poverty*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975.

** Edgar R. Owens and Robert Shaw, *Development Reconsidered*, D.C. Heath & Co., Lexington, Mass. 1974.

** See *Food First*, Chapter 5 (hb); Chapter 3 (pb).

3. Birth control programs alone will not significantly lower the population growth rate. Economic changes must first make smaller families a rational choice; birth control programs can then make smaller families a feasible choice.

More than ignorance of birth control or lack of access to contraceptives, large families reflect the powerlessness of people.

Where poor families are pitted against each other for survival, another child will be seen as an asset–a means of bringing in additional income and a source of security in old age. Large families are then a rational choice for survival. Moreover, given poor nutrition, sanitation, and medical care, parents realize that they must have large families to insure the survival of even one son to adulthood.

** Barry Commoner, "How Poverty Breeds Overpopulation," reprinted in

Population and Human Resources, Center for the Biology of Natural Systems, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.

** Mahmood Mamdani, *The Myth of Population Control: Family, Class and Caste in an Indian Village*, Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1972.

** See *Food First*, Chapters 8, 9, 10 (hb); Chapters 4, 5, 6 (pb).

Large families also reflect the special powerlessness of women. Even when a woman realizes the gain from having an additional child has become small or nonexistent, she may hesitate to use birth control for fear of rejection by her husband on whom she is dependent.

* Perdita Huston, "Power and Pregnancy," *New Internationalist* No. 52, June 1977. (Huston traveled throughout the rural areas in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, interviewing women about their motivations, fears, and birth control practices.)

People will opt for fewer children only after the economic system assures basic security so that families do not have to rely solely on their own offspring.

The People's Republic of China demonstrates the capacity of people to lower the birth rate rapidly once basic security needs have been met. In China universal health care, old age security, and guaranteed jobs and food staples mean that large families are no longer a survival necessity. China's birth rate has dropped more precipitously than perhaps any in history—from 32 births per 1000 in 1970 to between 20 and 25 only five years later.

** William Rich, *Smaller Families through Social and Economic Progress*, Overseas Development Council, Washington, D.C., 1973. Rich demonstrates that rising GNP is not associated with lower birth rates as much as with the more equal distribution of resources.

** Leo Orleans, "China's Experience in Population Control: The Elusive Model," prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1974.

** Leo Orleans, "China's Birth Rate, Death Rate, and Population Growth: Another Perspective," also prepared by the Library of Congress (see above), 1977.

Greater economic security alone, however, may not itself adequately lower birth rates. Education and the easy accessibility of contraceptives are also essential. To lower its birth rates, the Chinese launched a massive educational campaign, explaining why fewer children made sense both for the family and the nation. Contraceptives are available to all married women and are free.

Birth control programs can be effective and serve the interests of the poor only when they 1) are integrated into a total health care system that is reducing child mortality rates, 2) include the education of both men and women, 3) are village-based, training staff from the villages in which they will serve, and 4) are part of an overall educational program in which people are transforming the economic forces limiting their lives and keeping them powerless.

** See *Food First*, Chapter 9, 10 (hb); Chapter 5, 6 (pb).

* For a thorough discussion of the Chinese birth control programs in the context for medical, social, and economic changes, see Leo Orleans on page 11.

* For examples of village-based birth control programs operating as part of a total educational effort in the empowerment of poor people in repressive countries, see *The Savar Project, Meeting the Rural Health Crisis in Bangladesh*, and *BRAC: Building Human Infrastructures to Serve the Rural Poor*, International Council for Educational Development, P.O. Box 217, Essex, Conn., 06426.

For examples of the opposite approach see:

* Comptroller General of the United States, "Impact of Population Assistance to An African Country" (Ghana), Agency for International Development, June 23, 1977.

** "The Story of PIEGO: USAID and Female Sterilization Policy in the Developing Countries," *Asian Action* No. 10, Sept./Oct., 1977, Asian Cultural Forum on Development.

** Betsy Hartmann and Jim Boyce, *The View from the Village, New Internationalist*, No. 49, March 1977. (The experience of one village with family planning authorities.)

** Ian Guest, "The Great Pill Push." *New Internationalist*, No. 49, March 1977.

** Bonnie Mass, *Population Target: The Political Economy of Population Control in Latin America*, Latin America Working Group, Toronto, 1976.

4. Rapid population growth is, then, for many countries a grave problem: it can exacerbate the difficulty of achieving the economic restructuring necessary to end hunger; but rapid population growth is not the cause of hunger.

If the world's population were cut in half tomorrow, there would still be hungry people. Continuing to grow at current rates will certainly undercut the future well-being of all of us. But this self-evident truth adds even greater urgency to the task of identifying the root causes of both hunger and rapid population growth—the current powerlessness of so many to control the resources they need for survival.

Farmer supervising laborers in India. *AID photo by R.L. Saini.*

PART II

The Cause of Hunger is the Inequality in Control Over Food-Producing Resources

Inequality in control over food producing resources results in hunger because it leads to the underuse and the misuse of those resources, as suggested in Part I. In Part II, these inequalities, their effects, and their roots are identified. The inequalities in control over productive assets that cause hunger exist between national economies, within nations, within communities, within families, and among races. In many cases they are growing. Some of these key inequalities have their roots in colonialism.

THE COLONIAL INHERITANCE: Roots of Modern Inequalities

The inequalities that generate hunger today were in many societies initiated or reinforced by the intrusions of colonial powers into the economies of the now underdeveloped countries.

General

** Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.* London: Bogle L'Ouverture, 1972.

** George L. Beckford, *Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.

** Jack Woddis, *Introduction to Neo-Colonialism.* New York: International Publishers, 1967.

* L.A. Gann and Peter Dugnan, *The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870-1914. Colonialism in Africa, 1872-1960.* Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

** Pierre Jalée, *The Pillage of the Third World,* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.

** Eduardo Galeano, *Open Veins in Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.

* Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

** Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America,* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.

** Samir Amin, *Unequal Development,* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977.

** Basil Davidson, *Can Africa Survive?* New York: Little Brown, 1974.

** See *Food First,* Parts III and IV (hb); Parts II and III (pb).

1. The colonizing powers viewed the agricultural systems of the subjugated lands as backward and primitive precisely because they did not produce a marketable surplus that would meet the need of the colonizers to extract wealth.

The colonizing powers accordingly set out to reduce diversified self-provisioning agriculture to one or two cash crops. Here lie the origins of food dependency.

Sahel: The French militarily conquered the peoples of the Sahel region of West Africa in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Having established a permanent presence, the French looked for ways to make their new subjects pay for the administrative costs of occupation. The Sahelian peoples were self-reliant; the colonial administration was not. The French solution to this problem of their own making was to force the peasants to cultivate crops for export, particularly peanuts and cotton. Cotton was needed for France's textile mills since England controlled most other sources. Peanuts were to provide a cheap substitute for walnut oil then commonly used in France and the peanut cake could be fed to livestock in France.

** Thurston Clarke, *The Last Caravan*. New York: Putnam, 1978. (On Niger)

** Jean Copans *et al.*, *Secheresses et Famines du Sahel*, 2 vol., Paris: Francois Maspero, 1975.

** Comite Information Sahel, *Qui se nourrit de la famine en Afrique*. The Comite was organized by French Africanists during the Sahel famine.

** Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin. *The Political Economy of Ecological Destruction: Drought, Famine and Development in the West African Sahel*. Montclair, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun and Co., 1979.

India: Before the British, a diversified agriculture flourished. Under the British the acreage devoted to export crops was expanded spectacularly. Irrigation works were carried out but for exports ranging from cotton to grain. Numerous severe famines developed.

** Radha Sinha, *Food and Poverty*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1976, pp. 26f.

West Africa: In the Gambia, rice farming had been common before colonialism. With colonialism much of the best land was taken over by peanuts. Central Ghana, once famous for its yams and other foodstuffs, was forced to concentrate solely on cocoa. Food production in Dahomey and Southeast Nigeria was all but abandoned in favor of palm oil.

** Peter Feldman and David Lawrence, "Social and Economic Implications of the Large-Scale Introduction of New Varieties of Foodgrains," Africa Report, mimeo, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 1975.

** Samir Amin, *Neo Colonialism in West Africa*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.

2. In many cases the colonizers directly took over production, usurping the best lands.

The use of slave or wage laborers often led to high population

densities, resulting in environmental destruction and hunger.

** Keith Griffin, "Underdevelopment in History," in Charles Wilbur, ed., *Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment.* New York: Random House, 1973.

Kenya: The Kenyan highlands, agriculturally desirable, were declared Crown Land. Tracts often over 250,000 acres were granted to British lords.

** Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,* London: Bogle L'Ouverture, 1972.

Sri Lanka (Ceylon): In 1815 the British designated the vast central part of the island as Crown Land and sold it cheaply to British planters. Coffee and later tea were introduced. Laborers by the tens of thousands were imported from India.

** George L. Beckford, *Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Indonesia (Java): In 1870 the Dutch declared all uncultivated land the property of the state for lease to Dutch plantation enterprises. In addition foreign companies were authorized to lease village-owned communal lands.

** Erich Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia.* New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961.

** Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama.* New York: Pantheon, 1966.

* James Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Latin America: Colonial landowners took over the most fertile land and forced the indigenous peoples to move to the poor, erosion-prone mountainsides.

** Keith Griffin, "Underdevelopment in History," in Charles Wilbur, ed., *Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment,* New York: Random House, 1973.

** Suzanne Jonas and David Tobis (eds.), *Guatemala,* Berkeley, CA: North America Congress on Latin America, 1974.

** Eduardo Galeano, *Open Veins of Latin America,* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.

In the case of Puerto Rico, the control over the economy by U.S. economic interests during the period 1900 to 1950 displaced the traditional (jibaro) peasant farmers and created a pool of agricultural day laborers for the large U.S. owned sugar plantations. Since 1950 labor and capital-intensive industries have almost completely eradicated the agricultural sector in Puerto

Rico. Puerto Rico produces what it does not consume and consumes what it does not produce. Most food comes from the U.S.

** Robert Gabriner et al., *Puerto Rico: The Flame of Resistance*, San Francisco, CA: Peoples Press, 1978 (available from the Institute for Independent Social Journalism, PO Box 174, Old Chelsea Station, New York, N.Y. 10011).

** Joseph Collins, Frances Moore Lappé and David Kinley, "Puerto Rico: The Hunger Crop," in *Reprint Packet 1*, San Francisco, CA. IFDP, 1979.

3. **In other cases the colonizers forced peasant producers to grow cash and export crops.**

Sahel: The French commonly used taxation as an instrument to force peasants to produce cash crops. Research and inputs such as fertilizers were exclusively for cash crops.

** See sources cited on page 15 on the Sahel.

Indonesia: The Dutch colonial administrators made the peasants an offer they couldn't refuse: if they would grow government-owned export crops on one-fifth of their land, the Dutch would remit their land taxes. If they refused and thus could not pay their taxes, they lost their land.

** Clifford Geertz, *Agricultural Involution*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963.

Physical force—whips and guns—was not uncommon.

** Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London: Bogle L'Ouverture, 1972.

4. **The colonizers needed an abundant supply of food-desperate laborers to work on their plantations. Colonial administrations therefore devised a variety of tactics to undercut self-provisioning peasant agriculture and thus to make rural populations dependent on plantation wages. Good lands were sometimes even usurped and held idle so that peasants could not use them.**

** Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London: Bogle L'Ouverture, 1972.

** George Beckford, *Persistent Poverty*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.

British Guiana: In the mid-19th century, sugar plantation owners in British Guiana faced both the emancipation of slaves and a crash in the world sugar market. To prevent the ex-slaves from gaining access to land, laws were passed making it illegal

to sell land in parcels smaller than 100 acres.

** Alan Adamson, *Sugar Without Slaves: The Political Economy of British Guiana, 1838-1904*. Yale University Press, 1972.

** Philip Reno, *The Ordeal of British Guiana*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964.

Indonesia: The Dutch East Indies Company outlawed the purchase of sugar from local producers in Java and slapped a heavy tax on locally produced rubber.

** Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*. New York: Pantheon, 1966.

5. Colonialism destroyed the cultural patterns of production and exchange by which traditional societies previously met their needs. Many precolonial social structures, while dominated by exploitative elites, had evolved a system of mutual obligations among the classes that helped to ensure at least a minimal diet for all.

Most significantly, in many societies, colonizing administrations forcibly introduced the private ownership of land. Where previously it had been unthinkable that anyone did not share in access to land, landlessness became common.

India: Before the British ruled India, debt was commonplace but the moneylender was not powerful. Much of the reason was that land was not owned privately. Without private ownership it was impossible to lose land through indebtedness. Once the British established private ownership to facilitate tax collection, the position of the smallholders, as most were, became precarious. With private ownership, land became the collateral for loans with which to pay one's taxes in bad times. With continuing hard times, cultivators lost their land, as the colonial legal system put its weight behind foreclosures.

** Francine R. Frankel, "The Politics of the Green Revolution: Shifting Patterns of Peasant Participation in India and Pakistan," in Thomas T. Poleman and Donald K. Freebairn, eds., *Food, Population and Employment*, New York: Praeger, 1973.

* Barrington Moore, *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.

Bengal, India (West Bengal and Bangladesh today): In 1793 the British made the traditional elites into landed proprietors, in exchange for an annual fixed revenue to be paid to the Crown. The stated purpose was to ensure adequate revenue for the East India Company.

** Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*. New York: Pantheon, 1966, Vol. 1, Part III, Chapter 10.

** Edgar Owens and Robert Shaw, *Development Reconsidered.* Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath, 1974.

* Eric Stokes, *The Peasant and the Raj—Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant Rebellion in Colonial India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Africa: Private ownership was comparatively rare in black Africa before the onslaught of colonial rule.

** Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.*

** Peter Feldman and David Lawrence (see pg. 15).

Monetary indebtedness led to landlessness and hunger. Large landholders, among others, took on the role of moneylending. By foreclosing, they expanded their holdings.

Indonesia (Java): With the Dutch imposition of taxes, peasants in difficulty could only turn to the local Chinese moneylenders. When the peasants could not repay a loan, they in effect became tenants on their own land, forced to grow crops chosen by the creditors for a below-market price determined by the creditors. This association in turn fueled anti-Chinese racism.

** G.M. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia.* Ithaca: Cornell, 1970, Chapter 1.

The transfer of people of one race and culture to work plantations in a foreign land was a basic strategy of colonialism. People of different racial and cultural backgrounds were thrown together in conditions of extreme hardship. Racial differences and antagonisms were tools for colonizers to control the labor force.

** George L. Beckford, *Persistent Poverty,* pp. 82ff. (See Beckford reference above for account of Tamils brought from India to Ceylon for permanent labor on the tea estates. Most of their descendants today are still not recognized as citizens.)

INEQUALITIES BETWEEN NATIONS TODAY

Economic inequalities between the industrial countries and the Third World reflect in part the disproportionate control held by corporations and financial institutions based in the industrial countries.

** See *Food First,* Parts VI and VIII (hb and pb).

1. These institutions control the profits of Third World commodity exports.

Most of the commodities that provide export income to the underdeveloped countries—bananas, cocoa, palm oil, coffee, and so forth—are controlled by a handful of corporations based in the United States and Europe. The corporations produce the crop themselves, contract with local estate owners for the production, or buy it through marketing boards controlled by a domestic elite. They then market the commodity. The lion's share of the return goes to the foreign corporation, not to the domestic economy.

Bananas: The $2 billion banana industry is controlled by three giants. A banana producing country gets only an average of 11 cents out of every final retail dollar spent on bananas.

** Frederick Clairmonte, "Bananas," in Cheryl Payer, ed., *Commodity Trade in the Third World*, New York: Wiley, 1975.

** UNRISD, "The Marketing and Distribution System for Bananas," (1978/1974) TD/B/C.1/162.

Cocoa: One multinational corporation, Gill and Duffus, controls 40 percent of the world cocoa trade. They manufacture chocolate, hedge and speculate in the cocoa futures market, and publish the industry's newspaper. There are no checks preventing a corporation like Gill and Duffus from manipulating the market to maximize its profits. In 1967 the gross profit margin in chocolate processing was 38 percent above the average margin for comparable food processing industries.

** Robert Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966.

* Tetteh A. Kofi, "Role of Multinational Corporations in Cocoa Marketing and Pricing and Economic Development in Produce (African) Countries" in Carl Widstrand, ed. *Multinational Firms in Africa*, Africa Institute for Economic Development and Planning, Dakar, Senegal; and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, 1975.

** John Freivalds, "Futures Market—A New Way to Price Stability," *African Development*, September, 1975.

* "Marketing and Distribution System for Cocoa," report by the Secretariat, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, January, 1975.

Palm Oil: Unilever alone controls 80 percent of the international oil seed market. Zaire is a major producer. When the world market price declines, the economy of Zaire suffers much more than Unilever. Unilever simply appeals to the government for multiple tax exemptions.

** Guy Gran, "Zaire, 1978: The Ethical and Intellectual Bankruptcy of the World System," *Africa Today*, Vol. 25, No. 4, October-December, 1978, pp. 5-24.

** Carl Widstrand, ed., *Multinational Firms in Africa*, Africa Institute for Economic Development and Planning, Dakar, Senegal; and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, 1975.

2. Corporations based in the industrial countries control profits from subsidiaries in the underdeveloped nations.

"Between 1965 and 1968, 52 percent of all profits of U.S. subsidiaries operating in Latin America in manufacturing—the most dynamic sector of the hemisphere's economy—were repatriated to the United States. This means that for every dollar of net profit earned by a global corporation subsidiary, 52 cents left the country, even though 78 percent of the investment funds used to generate that dollar of profit came from local sources."

** Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Mueller, *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporation*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1974 (source of quote).

** Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence" in K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges, eds., *Readings in U.S. Imperialism*, Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1971.

** Susanne Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," in K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges (eds.) *Readings in U.S. Imperialism.*

3. The terms of trade favor the industrial nations.

On top of the fact that the foreign firms in control of marketing and processing get a larger share of the return from Third World exports than do the producers in Third World economies, the value per unit of exports (mainly manufactured goods) from the industrial countries is greater than the per unit value of products (largely raw materials) from the underdeveloped countries, and this difference has been growing.

In 1975 the index of manufacturers' prices (affecting 60 percent of the exports from the industrial countries) went up to 140, compared to 1960, while the commodity price index in 1975 hovered around 114.

** *Finance and Development*, World Bank, December 1977.

In 1960 three tons of bananas could buy a tractor. In 1970 an equivalent tractor cost eleven tons of bananas.

** "Changing Factors in World Development," *Development Issue Paper 5*, Global One, United Nations Development Program, 1975.

** Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange*, New York and London: Monthly

Review Press, 1972. Most thorough examination of deteriorating terms of trade for the underdeveloped countries.

** Samir Amin, *Unequal Development*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977. See pages 138-54 for summary of Emmanuel's analysis.

4. Lack of control of external capital and the debt burden hurt the economies of underdeveloped countries.

Sources of external development capital are tightly controlled by private and government agencies based in the industrial economies—private banks and international public lending agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Between 1967 and 1978 the total debt burden of the non-oil producing underdeveloped countries, both public and private, increased fourfold, from $43.7 billion to about $180 billion. If payments on loans from private lenders are also considered, by 1971 the sum paid out by non-oil exporting underdeveloped countries—over $13 billion—in debt service payments approached the total development assistance coming in from government sources.

** See *Food First* Chapter 39 (hb); Chapter 41 (pb).

** Howard M. Wachtel, *The New Gnomes: Multinational Banks in the Third World*, Transnational Institute, Washington, D.C., 1977.

* *Money and Finance and Transfer of Real Resources for Development*, report of the Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, February, 1976.

* World Bank, *World Debt Tables, External Public Debt of Developing Countries*, Vols. I & II, Sept. 1977.

For debt-burdened underdeveloped countries in need of additional loans, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), controlled by the industrial countries, can play a determining role. The IMF determines the credit rating of a country based on its foreign exchange and trade balances. With a good evaluation from the IMF a country can get private and public funds on good terms. But the country cannot get a good rating unless it accepts IMF "advice": reduced public spending, increased taxes, and currency devaluation—all of which penalize the poorest groups.

In 1977 the IMF demand for reduced public spending as a condition for a loan to Egypt forced the government to end food subsidies. Protest riots killed 78. Although the Egyptian government reinstated the food subsidies, it did so in breach of

IMF conditions and is in danger of losing IMF "drawing rights."

** See *Food First* Chapter 42 (hb); Chapter 44 (pb).

** Cheryl Payer, *The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World*, London: Penguin Books, 1974.

** "The Links Between Human Rights and Basic Needs," Center for International Policy, Washington, D.C., 1978. (source on Egypt)

INEQUALITIES WITHIN NATIONS

Even if the inequalities in control among nations were eliminated completely, poverty and hunger would still exist. It is the inequalities in control over food-producing resources *within* countries that are the prime determinants of who shall and who shall not eat. (In addition to the following, refer to sources cited in Part III.)

1. Inequality in control over land is extreme and increasing.

** See *Food First*, Part V (hb); Part IV and V (pb).

Concentration: In an 83-country study, roughly 3 percent of all holdings accounted for 79 percent of all farmland.

** *Report on the 1960 Census of World Agriculture*, Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. (Land concentration has increased during the 1970s. See Part III.)

** Keith Griffin, *Land Concentration and Rural Poverty*, New York: Macmillan Co., 1975.

A similar pattern of land concentration and landlessness is intensified here in the United States. By 1969 the top 5.5 percent of all farms had come to operate 54 percent of all farmland, while the bottom 40 percent operated only 4.5 percent. Between 1960 and 1976 fourteen hundred farms folded each week in the United States.

** *Our Land and Water Resources*, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service Misc. Publication No. 1290, 1974.

* *Handbook of Agricultural Charts*, Agricultural Handbook No. 504, United States Dept. of Agriculture (USDA), 1976.

California: Concentration of control of the land has progressed much further in states like California where today only 45 cor-

porations control 30 percent of the state's prime farmland.

** Robert C. Fellmelth, *Politics of land: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Land Use in California*, New York: Grossman, 1973.

Landlessness and nearlandlessness are also increasing, now typically comprising 50 to 80 percent of the rural labor force. In Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, the Philippines, Pakistan, Java, and Bangladesh, the percentage is over 80.

** Milton J. Esman and Associates, *Landlessness and Nearlandlessness*, Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, commissioned by AID, 1978.

2. **In addition to the best land, other resources needed to produce—water, irrigation equipment, fertilizer, pesticides—and the credit to secure these resources are increasingly controlled by the few.**

"In Pakistan, the Agricultural Development Bank provides tubewell loans only to those who own a minimum of 12.5 to 25 acres. This lending criteria excludes over 80 percent of the nation's farmers."

** Keith Griffin, *The Political Economy of Agrarian Change*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Five percent of farmers in Africa have access to institutional credit.

** World Bank, *The Assault on World Poverty*, 1975.

Data on interest rates are hard to collect; however, one study of 224 rich farmers in the Philippines shows that 15 percent of the borrowers paid an interest rate of over 200 percent while another fifth paid no interest at all.

** Jose Gapud, "Financing Lowland Rice Farming in Selected Barrios in Munoz, Nueva Ecija," *Economic Research Journal*, September, 1959.

* U.N. Research Institute for Social Development, *Agrarian Change and the New Technology in India*, Geneva: 1977.

3. **Because of the inequalities in control over productive assets, income is also increasingly unequal, often masked by per capita measures of growth which hide inequalities.**

Philippines: Between 1965 and 1974 agricultural production

rose by 42 percent but the daily real wages in agriculture fell by almost one-third.

Bangladesh: Between 1963 and 1975 the proportion of rural households classified as extremely poor increased five times while about 15 percent of the population had significantly higher real incomes in 1975.

Malaysia: Between 1957 and 1970 the bottom 20 percent of the rural households experienced a fall of over 40 percent in their average income. The top 20 percent increased their mean income 21 percent.

** Keith Griffin and Azizur Rahman Khan, *Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia*, Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1977.

Brazil: During the "economic miracle" in the 1960s, the wealthiest 5 percent of the population increased their share of the national income from 27.8 percent to 36.8 percent, while the share of the bottom 40 percent shrank from 10.6 percent to 8.1 percent. In the words of former Brazilian President Emilio Medici, "Brazil is doing well but the people are not."

** Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Mueller, *Global Reach*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974.

INEQUALITIES BASED IN SEXISM

The impact of sexism on hunger is two-fold:

1. **First is the direct impact of sexism on the nutrition of women.**

   Because of their reproductive function women often have higher nutritional needs than men. Nevertheless they are generally given lower priority in food distribution within the family. In many cultures men regularly eat before women and in certain cultures women are forbidden to eat certain high-protein foods such as fish, eggs, and poultry.

   ** Although comparative nutritional studies of men and women are rare, a useful discussion of the well-acknowledged reality can be found in "Who Really Starves?" Mary Roodkowsky and Lisa Leghorn, Boston Industrial Mission (Friendship Press, New York), 1977.

   * Elise Boulding, *Women in the Twentieth Century World*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977.

2. **Second is the impact of discrimination against women on the**

entire family's diet, particularly as economies change, i.e. the commercialization of agriculture undercuts the traditional roles of women.

As men are increasingly drawn into wage labor (in mines, on plantations, in industry, etc.) women are forced to supplement the male's wages by unpaid labor, producing food. The result is two fold:

(1) Men are in control of the cash income and, often separated from the family, use it for "bachelor type" consumer goods for themselves. The family's nutrition can suffer.

* Robert Chambers and Jon Moris, eds., *Mwea: An Irrigated Rice Settlement in Kenya*. Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1973.

(2) Because women must carry on both their traditional duties plus food production, crops requiring the least maintenance (often less nutritious ones) are substituted for more nutritious crops.

* *Women in Food Production, Food Handling and Nutrition, With Special Emphasis on Africa*. New York: Protein-Calorie Advisory Group, U.N., June 1977.

** Judith Van Allen, "African Women, Modernization, and National Liberation," in *Women in the World*, Santa Barbara, CA: Clio Books, 1976.

* D. R. Reynolds, "An Appraisal of Rural Women in Tanzania," prepared for the Regional Economic Development Services Office—AID, 1975.

Women are generally paid less than men for their labor.

* Ester Boserup, *Woman's Role in Economic Development*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970.

Sri Lanka: On tea estates a male worker can earn $14.00 a month, but the maximum paid a female worker is $11.40.

** Gamini Navaratne, "Tea," *New Internationalist*, April 1976.

Philippines: On export banana plantations women are relegated to the lower paid jobs in the packing houses while men are given the higher paid field jobs.

** Frances Moore Lappe and Eleanor McCallie, "The Banana Industry in the Philippines," mimeo, Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1977.

When women are engaged in plantation production, the nutritional deprivation can fall hardest on infants and children.

Whereas formerly women worked on small plots near their homes and were able to integrate agricultural work into their

other domestic work, plantation work requires that they travel long distances and either take their small children with them or leave them in the village. In the latter case, weaning may begin at too early an age, exposing the child to many nutritional hazards.

** Ted Greiner, "Breastfeeding in Decline," IPPF/IUNS. International Planned Parenthood Foundation/International Union of Nutritional Sciences, 1977.

The introduction of technology in agriculture has intensified the inequalities between men and women to the detriment of family food production and overall development.

As machinery gets more complex (more "modern") its use is monopolized by men. This is not because women are physically unable to manage the equipment; it is because the agricultural specialists import Western notions of sex roles along with their machinery and assume that men (like themselves) will handle it.

** Elizabeth Faulker Baker, *Technology and Women's Work*, New York, 1964.

"Western male technical experts' bias against women as farmers has resulted in men being trained in the use of new techniques and equipment, while women have been left with hoes and digging sticks. Through a combination of male control over the land and the biases of European experts, cash cropping has become primarily a male enterprise. . . ."

** Judith Van Allen, "Women, 'Modernization' and National Liberation," in *Women in the World*, Santa Barbara, CA: Clio Books, 1976.

". . . the dramatic recent rise in the use of small machine rice-hullers, owned by wealthy villagers, to replace hand-pounding in the processing of the rice harvests has resulted in the loss of another relatively lucrative labour opportunity for women."

** Benjamin White, "Population, Involution and Employment in Rural Java", Staff Paper 76-4, Agricultural Development Council, New York, p. 282. (source of quote).

** Ester Boserup, *Women's Role in Economic Development*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1970.

** Barbara J. Callaway, "Women in Ghana," in *Women in the World.*

Sexism means that women's skills and thinking about food and development are lost, and that causes hunger.

** Wellesley Editorial Committee, *Women and National Development: The Complexities of Change*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.

* Irene Tinker and Michèle Bo Bramsen, eds., *Women and World Development.* Washington D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1976.

INEQUALITIES BASED IN RACISM

Throughout history racism has been used as a justification for the economic inequalities that cause hunger—the inequalities between nations and within nations. The colonizers' belief in their own racial superiority was one of the motive forces behind colonialism. And within virtually every nation, people of lighter color have achieved economic superiority. This is true in India or Latin America just as it is true in the United States.

** Franz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks,* MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1968.

** Paul Jacobs, Saul Landau and Eve Pell, *To Serve the Devil,* Vols. 1 and 2, New York: Vintage Books, 1976. A documentary analysis of America's racial history and why it has been kept hidden.

1. Slavery is the most extreme form of racism and has caused hunger directly and indirectly.

Slavery stripped numerous villages of able-bodied young men and women. Often not enough labor power was available to prepare enough ground for cultivation.

** Samir Amin, "L'Afrique sous-peuplée," *Developpement et Civilisation,* Nos. 47-48 (March-June 1972).

The condition of slavery itself, of course, often meant hunger.

** Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery.* New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1966.

** Eugene Genovese, *Roll Jordan Roll,* New York: Vintage Books, 1976.

Racial differences and antagonisms—often a result of colonialism—are used to divide and superexploit the labor force.

** George L. Beckford, *Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.

** Jay Mandel, "The Plantation Economy and Its Aftermath," URPE (Union of Radical Political Economists), *Review of Radical Political Economy,* 1974.

2. The second most extreme form of institutionalized racism is apartheid.

In South Africa, race and color have been preponderant in

determining the allocation of resources among all inhabitants.

** *Land Tenure Conditions in South Africa.* United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, December, 1976. Studies carried out by Food and Agriculture Organizations, FAO.

** Africa Research Group, *Race to Power*, New York: Athenum, 1972.

In South Africa the poor and the hungry are the Africans and the coloured. Some notion of the hunger impact of apartheid is obvious from official figures on per capita income. In 1970 the average monthly income for South Africans of different groups was: White $457, Indian $179, Coloured $108, and Africans $41.

3. **In countries like the United States racism serves to keep non-whites in low-paying jobs such as migrant field work.**

Estimates are that between 60,000 and 200,000 Puerto Ricans work in agricultural jobs in the United States each year. Approximately 20,000 foreign agricultural workers enter the U. S. each year under temporary visas whereby the industry can prevent all labor organizing and pay very low wages.

** E. P. LeVeen, "Agricultural Poverty and Rural Development in California," manuscript, University of California, Department of Agricultural Economics, 1977.

** NACLA *Report*, "Contract Labor in the United States," November, 1977.

THE INEFFICIENCY OF INEQUALITY: How Inequality in Control Over Productive Resources Results in the Underuse and Misuse of Resources

Inequality in control over productive assets causes hunger not only by denying the majority of people means to secure food, either by growing it themselves or buying it. (See documentation, pp 29ff.) Inequalities in control also result in the underutilization of resources, reducing the potential food supply.

** See *Food First*, Part V (hb and pb).

1. UNDERUSE OF RESOURCES

Large landholders, in control of most of the land (see p. 23),

are less productive than the smallholders.

Yields in the Third World: A study of the differences in the value of output on large and small farms in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Guatemala concluded that large farms were three to fourteen times less productive than the small farms.

** Solon Barraclough and Collarte, "Agrarian Structure in Latin America," in *Studies in the Economic and Social Development of Latin America*, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973.

** Edgar Owens and Robert Shaw, *Development Reconsidered: Bridging the Gap Between Government and People*, Lexington, Mass.: DC Heath, 1972.

* World Bank, *Assault on World Poverty—Profiles of Rural Development, Education and Health*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973.

Yields in the United States: Between 1960 and 1973 the largest farms realized a net income per acre smaller than family-size farms in every year except two.

** Calculated from the following USDA publications:

Statistical Bulletin No. 547
(Farm Income Statistics) July, 1975
Agricultural Information Bulletin No. 376, April 1975.

** Bruce F. Hall and E. Phillip Leveen, "Farm Size and Economic Efficiency: The Case of California" Working Paper No. 53, Division of Agricultural Services, University of California, Berkeley, Feb., 1978.

** Angus McDonald "The Family Farm is the Most Efficient Unit of Production" in Peter Barns, ed., *The People's Land*, Emmaus, Pa.: Rodale Press, 1976.

Unplanted land: Largeholders leave more of their land unplanted in contrast to small farmers.

Central America: Farmers who own up to 10 acres cultivate 72 percent of their land, but those with over 86 use 49 percent for pasture and leave 37 percent idle.

** *Agricultural Development and Employment Performance: A Comparative Analysis*, Agricultural Planning Studies No. 18, FAO, Rome, 1974.

Slowness to adopt improved techniques: Although the large farmer is thought always to be the innovator, some studies show that by virtue of being in control of resources, the largeholder can profit without innovation. He therefore can be slow to adopt improved techniques.

Mexico: Describing the large landholders in the northwest,

"With their ability both to lobby for higher prices and acquire more land, many large landowners scoffed at the idea of improved seeds for years after the much higher yield potential of the new seeds had been demonstrated."

** Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, "Social and Economic Implications of the Introduction of the New Varieties of Food Grains," *Mexico Report*, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1978.

When a few land holders control most of the productive assets, much wealth is drained out of agriculture into their private consumption or into urban or foreign investments. (See also Part IV.)

** Kathleen Gough, "Green Revolution in South India and Vietnam," *Monthly Review*, Vol. 29, No. 8, 1978.

** See de Alcántara above for description of the squandering of the wealth by large landholders in northwest Mexico.

Smallholders are unable to produce to their potential.

Even though smallholders produce more per acre than the largeholders, small farmers, tenants and sharecroppers underproduce compared to their productive potential.

Why?

1) Lacking economic and political power, they are unable to obtain the credit and therefore the agricultural inputs such as fertilizer to make their land produce more. (Documentation on p. 24.)
2) The motivation of tenants and sharecroppers to improve their land is undercut because they know their labor will likely benefit the landowner, not themselves.

** Keith Griffin, *The Political Economy of Agrarian Change*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.

** Keith Griffin and Azizur Rahman Khan, *Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia*, Geneva: International Labour Office, 1976.

** Erich and Charlotte Jacoby, *Man and Land*, New York, Knopf, 1971.

** Edgar Owens and Robert Shaw, *Development Reconsidered*, D. C. Heath and Co., 1974.

Competition for survival makes cooperation impossible.

Cooperative work is essential in the construction and main-

tenance of major agricultural improvements such as terracing, dams and irrigation networks that are necessary to increase production. But cooperation is not possible where unequal control over productive assets creates a climate of competition for survival. The poor must compete for the crumbs not monopolized by the rich and the rich scheme daily to further impoverish the poor in order to make them still more dependent.

For documentation of the competitive struggle in village life in the Third World, see:

Africa:

** Richard W. Franke and Barbara Chasin, *The Political Economy of Ecological Destruction*, Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun and Co., 1979.

** "Political and Economic Origins of African Hunger," Michael F. Lofchie, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1975.

** "Cooperators and Bureaucrats: Class Formation in a Senegalese Society," Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, *Africa* (Journal of the International African Institute), October, 1972.

** Joel and Rachel Samoff, "The Local Politics of Underdevelopment," *The African Review*, 1976.

Asia:

** Betsy Hartmann and James Boyce, *Needless Hunger: Voices from A Bangladesh Village*, San Francisco, CA: IFDP, 1979.

** Saghir Ahmad, *Class and Power in a Punjabi Village*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977.

* Jenneke Arens and Jos van Beurden, *Jhagrapur: Poor Peasants and Women in a Village in Bangladesh*, Amsterdam: Arens & Van Beurden, 1977.

* "Political Aspects of Poverty, Income Distribution and Its Measurements: Some Examples from Rural Java," Paper prepared for Asia Society Seminar, Nov. 21-25, 1977, Singapore, Benjamin White, Agricultural Development Council specialist attached to the Agro-Economic Survey, Bogor, Indonesia.

Latin America:

** Andrew Pearse, *The Latin American Peasant*, London: Frank Cass & Co., 1975.

** Ernest Feder, *The Rape of the Peasantry*, New York: Doubleday Anchor.

General:

* Charles Elliott, *Patterns of Poverty in the Third World*, New York: Praeger, 1975.

** Teodor Shanin, ed., *Peasants and Peasant Societies*, London: Penguin Books, 1971.

For documentation of productive potential of cooperative work once control over productive resources is shared, see Part IV.

2. MISUSE OF RESOURCES

Where the majority of people are severely cut out from a share in control over food-producing resources, their impoverishment means that they cannot make their needs felt in the marketplace. Food-producing resources therefore are made to serve those who can pay—the upper domestic strata and higher paying markets abroad. Export and luxury crops expand, therefore, while basic food crops are neglected. In the face of the hunger of so many, this constitutes a grave misuse of resources; it is built into a system of inequitable control of resources.

For documentation, see Part I and Part III (Agribusiness).

Bananas being loaded onto ships in Ecuador. *World Bank photo by Edwin G. Huttman.*

PART III

The Solution Is Not Technology, Not Agribusiness, Nor Official Development Assistance

If inequalities in control over productive assets are at the root of rural poverty and hunger, then any strategy that increases those inequalities cannot solve the problem of hunger and indeed, will only deepen hunger.

THE NARROW PRODUCTION FOCUS

Increased local production of food is not in itself the solution to hunger. Diagnosing the problem of hunger as inadequate production and focusing on the "modernization" of agriculture has resulted in strengthening the position of a rural elite. The result is that the poor majority are even further cut out of control over and even participation in the production process. Greater hunger, rather than less, is the result.

** See *Food First*, Part V (hb); Part IV (pb).

1. Only the better-off can afford the Green Revolution.[1]

The "higher-yielding" seeds of the Green Revolution turned out not to be higher yielding *in and of themselves* but dependent on just the right conditions—adequate fertilizer, pesticides, and irrigation. Thus the new seeds were usable only by those farmers with access to credit, with adequate land to make the investment profitable, and with enough financial security to be able to risk trying new, less reliable seed varieties.

** Ingrid Palmer, *Science and Agricultural Production*, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 1972.

** Keith Griffin, *The Political Economy of Agrarian Change*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975, especially pp. 51-63.

** Susan George, *How the Other Half Dies*, New York: Penguin Books, 1976.

** Kenneth Dahlberg, *Beyond the Green Revolution*, New York: Plenum Press, (227 W. 17th Street, New York, NY 10011), 1979.

** See *Food First*, Chapters 16, 17 (hb); Chapters 15 and 16 (pb).

** Also UNRISD studies; see pages 15, 31, 38.

The cash costs of farming with the new rice seeds in the Philippines are 11 times greater than when traditional varieties are used.

** International Rice Research Institute, "Changes in Rice Farming in Selected Areas of Asia," 1975, Manila, Philippines.

---

[1] The Green Revolution was the term coined to describe the introduction of new seed varieties, but came to be used to describe the package of seeds and technology that was intended to "modernize" Third World agriculture.

"The new technology puts a relative handicap on those whose assets include traditional knowledge of the local idiosyncrasies of soil and climate and whose energies are absorbed by the labors of husbandry . . . it gives the advantage to those skilled in manipulating influence."

** Andrew Pearse, *Bitter Rice*, forthcoming late 1979. Information regarding the publication available through UNRISD, Geneva.

2. The mechanization of production without first restructuring the control over that production will intensify inequality by displacing labor.

In societies with abundant labor supplies mechanization of agriculture has profited the individual entrepreneur, but by increasing unemployment and underemployment, it has often been costly to the society as a whole.

General

** Keith Griffin, *The Political Economy of Agrarian Change*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.

** See *Food First*, Chapter 20 (hb and pb).

** International Labor Office, *Mechanization and Employment in Agriculture*, Geneva, 1973.

A cautious estimate is that as of 1972 two and a half million jobs had been lost in Latin America alone due to agricultural mechanization. Less than one-third of the displaced laborers have found other rural employment.

* *The Pace and Form of Farm Mechanization in Developing Countries*, commissioned by the Massey-Ferguson Corporation, (200 University Ave., Toronto, Canada M5H3E4), 1972.

For each tractor purchased in Pakistan, between 7.5 and 11.8 full-time jobs are lost. In recent years employment per acre has declined about 40 percent.

** John P. McInerney and Graham F. Donaldson, "The Consequences of Farm Tractors in Pakistan," World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 210, February, 1975.

Each tractor displaces about three workers in Chile and about four in Colombia and Guatemala.

** K.C. Abercrombie, "Agricultural Mechanization and Employment in Latin America," for the International Labor Organization in *Mechanization and Employment in Agriculture*, 1973.

"In 1962 a landgrant college in California developed a tomato harvester designed to process 150 acres, at a time when the

average tomato farm was only 44 acres. The price was prohibitive for the small holder. More recently a harvester for 350 acres has been designed. Total tomato acreage has increased by 150% but 3400 of the 4000 growers in 1962 are now out of business."

** Michael Perelman, *Farming for Profit in a Hungry World*, Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun and Co., 1978, p. 88. (source of quote)

** Arjun Makhijani with Alan Poole, *Energy and Agriculture in the Third World: A Report to the Energy Project of the Ford Foundation*, Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass., 1975.

3. A narrow production focus leads to the increasing concentration of control of agricultural resources in fewer hands.

The production focus on new seeds and new technology—mostly imported—has included larger credit allocations and tax law incentives for agriculture by governments and international lending agencies. These have helped to transform Third World agriculture into a sought after investment for both richer farmers and outside investors. The result is a catastrophic chain of events for the rural poor:

- —With greater opportunity to profit from agriculture, landlords evict tenants in order to cultivate the land themselves, and buy out poor farmers.
- —Competition for land drives up land values and rents; in some of the Green Revolution areas in India, for example, land values have climbed by three to fivefold.
- —Debt obligations of the poor increase as some small farmers try to take advantage of the new seeds.
- —Payments in kind and customary rights are abolished. For example, in Java obligations of the rich to allow all to participate in the harvest has been abolished and workers are paid on a cash basis.
- —Real wages fall, reflecting the abolition of customary rights and the impact of inflation on the cash income.
- —The numbers of landless increase, while at the same time, employment opportunities decline due to mechanization.

INTERNATIONAL

Although the specific manifestations of this transformation vary with each country, the pattern is clear: the increasing concentration of control over food-producing resources and the deepening impoverishment of the poor.

** Susan George, *How the Other Half Dies*, London: Penguin Books, 1976, Chapter 5.

** See *Food First*, Chapter 17 (hb); Chapters 16,18 (pb).

** Francine R. Frankel, "The Politics of the Green Revolution: Shifting Patterns of Peasant Participation in India and Pakistan" in Thomas T. Poleman and Donald K. Freebairn, eds., *Food, Population and Employment—the Impact of the Green Revolution*, New York: Praeger, 1973.

** United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), *The Social and Economic Implications of Large-scale Introduction of New Varieties of Foodgrains*, Geneva, 1975. This massive study of 18 individually authored volumes is based on intensive field studies carried out between 1970 and 1974.

Volumes especially recommended:

** Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, *Modernizing Mexican Agriculture: Socio-economic Implications of Technological Change 1940-1970.*

** Ingrid Palmer, *Food and the New Agricultural Technology.*

** Andrew Pearse, *The Social and Economic Implications of Large-Scale Introduction of New Varieties of Foodgrain: Summary of Conclusions.* Geneva: UNRISD, 1975.

Also:

** Keith Griffin, *The Political Economy of Agrarian Change: An Essay on the Green Revolution.* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1974.

** Clive Bell, "The Acquisition of Agricultural Technology: Its Determinants and Effects." *Journal of Development Studies.* Vol. 9, No. 1, 1972.

** M. Schluter and John W. Mellor, "New Seed Varieties and the Small Farm," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 7, No. 13, 1972.

** Joan Mencher, "Conflicts and Contradictions in the Green Revolution: The Case of Tamil Nadu," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Feb. 22, 1975.

** Wolf Ladejinsky, "Ironies of India's Green Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1970.

NATIONAL

The tightening of control over food manufacturing and distribution in the United States is even greater than the concentration of control over land (See Part II for land concentration figures). It is estimated that in food processing a mere 50 corporations now control nearly 90 percent of the profits of the entire industry. As a result of this concentration, quality of food is falling while prices rise. Food monopolies overcharge Americans on the order of $14 billion a year.

* John M. Connor and Loys L. Mather, *Directory of 200 Largest U.S. Food and Tobacco Processing Firms, 1975*, Economics, Statistics and Cooperatives Service, USDA, and North Central Regional Project NC-117, July, 1978.

** Russell C. Parker and John M. Connor, "Estimates of Consumer Loss Due to Monopoly in the U.S. Food Manufacturing Industires," Food Systems Research Group of North Central Research Project NC-117, July, 1978.

** Bruce W. Marion, "Government Regulation of Competition in the Food Industry," *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, (61), February 1, 1979.

** See *Food First*, Chapter 32 (hb); Chapter 34 (pb).

For general overview see:

** Jim Hightower, *Eat Your Heart Out*, New York: Vintage, 1976.

For statistical detail see:

* *CDE Stock Ownership Directory: Agribusiness*, New York: Corporate Data Exchange, 1978.

4. More food is produced per person yet there is more hunger and rural decline.

INTERNATIONAL

In many cases the focus on production has succeeded in increasing production of grains per person. In seven Asian countries studied, comprising 70 percent of the rural population of the non-socialist Third World, a focus on production raised production per head, with only one exception. Yet because of the processes described above, the rise in production per capita was associated with decline in the welfare of the bottom 20 to 80 percent of the rural people.

** See *Food First*, Chapter 17 (hb); Chapter 16 (pb).

* International Labor Office, *Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia*, 1977. This series of studies was carried out under the direction of Dr. Keith Griffin, an agricultural economist at Oxford and author of several books on rural development.

NATIONAL

Similarly in the United States, millions find it impossible to purchase a healthy diet, however great the national production. The percent of Americans eating less than the recommended amounts of at least one key nutrient increased from 15 percent in 1955 to 50 percent in 1972.

** See *Food First*, Chapters 32, 42 (hb); Chapter 34 (pb).

* *Dietary Levels of Households in the United States*, Agricultural Research Service, USDA 17-17, 1968.

* *First Health and Nutrition Examination Survey*. Preliminary Findings, Public Health Service, Health Resources Administration. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C., 1972.

Approximately 34 million Americans are eligible for food

stamps. Yet, even on Food Stamps it is difficult to secure a nutritious diet.

** U.S. Congress, Reports of the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1974.

** Nick Kotz, *Let Them Eat Promises: The Politics of Hunger in America*, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971.

** William Robbins, *The American Food Scandal*, New York: William Morrow, 1974.

5. Low-income Americans have measureably lower nutritional well-being than higher income groups.

The study cited found that children below the poverty line had a mean height that was 2.5 cm less than children living above the poverty line.

** Abraham, Lowenstein and O'Connell, *Study on Nutritional Status*, prepared by the United States National Center for Health Statistics, Rockville, Maryland, 1975.

AGRIBUSINESS EXACERBATES THE CONDITIONS THAT CAUSE HUNGER

1. Agribusiness does not and cannot "grow food for the hungry."

Agribusiness produces food either directly or through production contracts in order to sell at a profit; there must be a market for its production. But the hungry are precisely those too poor to "make up a market." Agribusiness corporations therefore channel agricultural resources—ranging from land to public credits—to produce for local elites and for export.

** See *Food First*, Chapter 33, 34, 35 (hb) and Chapters 35, 36, 39 (pb).

** *Agribusiness Manual*, Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, 1978. A collection of articles on many aspects of agribusiness in the United States and abroad.

** Susan George, *How the Other Half Dies*, Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld Osmun, 1978.

** Dan Morgan, *Merchants of Grain: The Power and Profits of the Five Giant Companies at the Center of the World's Food Supply*, New York: Viking, 1979.

* "Mode of Transnational Corporation Impact on Agriculture and Rural Development," draft manuscript for United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations, August, 1978.

United States:
What agribusiness has to "contribute" to the Third World can in part be judged by the affects of agribusiness in the industrial countries.

** Walter Goldschmidt, *As You Sow: Three Studies in the Social Consequences of Agribusiness*, Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun, 1978.

** Harrison Wellford, *Sowing the Wind*, New York: Grossman, 1972.

** Jim Hightower, *Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times*, Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1973. Focus on agribusiness links to public institutions.

Mexico. Land on which fruit and vegetable crops are now grown for multinational agribusiness was in some cases only recently converted from the cultivation of staples for local consumption.

In just 15 years, strawberry production for export to the United States in Mexico's Zamora valley has grown from nothing to 100,000 tons a year. This agribusiness has generated strawberry millionaires but poverty for the many.

** Ernest Feder, *Strawberry Imperialism*, Institute for Social Studies, The Hague; and Editorial Compesina, Mexico City, Mexico, 1978.

The Philippines. Del Monte corporation has used violence to force peasants from their land in order to produce pineapples for export to Japan. Del Monte has provided a local elite incentive to take over more land to grow bananas for export.

** Vincent G. Cullen, "Sour Pineapples," *America*, November 6, 1976. The author is a Catholic missionary in Bukidnon province of the Philippines who witnessed the land theft first hand.

** NACLA, "Bitter Fruits," *Latin America and Empire Report*, September, 1976. Includes original on-site research on Del Monte's operations in Mexico, Guatemala and California.

** Frances Moore Lappé and Eleanor McCallie, "Banana Hunger," *Food Monitor*, March/April, 1978, peges 11-13.

** Eleanor McCallie and Frances Moore Lappé, *The Philippines Banana Industry*, Institute for Food and Development Policy, San Francisco, 1977. Based on on-site investigations in 1977.

Central America. Agribusiness is growing fruits and vegetables in Central America for export to the United States, which now imports over half of certain of its fruits and vegetables during the winter and early spring months. Because of oversupply, about 65 percent of the fruits and vegetables grown for export

in Central America are "literally dumped or, where feasible, used as animal feed," since the local population cannot afford to buy them.

** Ray Goldberg, *Agribusiness Management for Developing Countries—Latin America*, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger 1974. (source of quote)

* James Austin, *Agribusiness in Latin America*, New York: Praeger, 1974. See especially pp. 14ff for data on oversupplies.

Colombia. Ralston Purina has pushed feedgrain and poultry industry, although the majority of the population are too impoverished to buy eggs or chicken. An acre of beans could nourish three times as many people as an acre planted in feedcrops for poultry. "(The) effect of Ralston Purina's presence has been . . . more food for a minority and less for the majority."

** Robert Ledogar, *Hungry for Profits*, New York: IDOC, 1975. Also has well-researched information on Gulf and Western's sugar operations in the Dominican Republic.

Senegal. Bud Senegal, a joint venture of an affiliate of California-based Bud Antle (now a subsidiary of Castle and Cooke) and the government of Senegal, specializes in producing vegetables for air-freighting to European capitals.

** Maureen M. Mackintosh, draft doctoral dissertation, Institute for Development Studies, Sussex, England.

Brazil. In the early 1970's multinationals such as Cargill, Anderson-Clayton, Central Soya, and the Chase Manhattan Bank moved into soyabean production in Brazil. All the production is either exported or sold locally as livestock feed. Soya production has massively displaced the cultivation of black beans, the traditional staple of the poor majority.

* Gerardo Mueller, "Companhias Transnacionais e Desenvolvimento na Agricultura Brasileira: O Setor das Oleaginosas," CEBRAP, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 1977.

* Plinio Sampaio, "Capital Estrangeiro na Agricultura Brasileira," CEBRAP, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 1977.

** *Latin America Newsletter*, Vol. 101 October 22, 1976.

Also in Brazil, giant multinational industrial firms have moved into large-scale ranching in the Amazon basin, expelling peasant families from the land.

** Jose da Veiga, "Quand les multinationales font du ranching," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September, 1975.

Iran. In Khuzestan province multinationals such as the Bank of America, Dow Chemical, Shell, Foremost-McKesson, Mitsui, Diamond A. Cattle and Hawaiian Agronomics have set up large-scale operations (including feedlots), expelling peasants from lands they received only a few years before as part of land reform.

* *Agriculture and Agribusiness in Iran: Investment Opportunities*, New York: Paul R. Walter and Associates, Inc., March 1975.
* Frances Fitzgerald, "Giving the Shah Everything He Wants," *Harper's*, November, 1974.
* "How Iran Spends Its New Found Riches," *Business Week*, June 22, 1974.

2. Attempts by multinational food processing companies to expand their markets in Third World countries have not benefitted the hungry and, in many cases, have actually caused nutritional damage.

** See *Food First* Chapters 36, 37, 40 (hb); Chapters 37, 38, 42 (pb).

The U.S.-based multinational food processing companies are what the Food and Drug Administration has termed "shared monopolies." (Fewer than 50 out of the roughly 30,000 food processing firms control over 50 percent of the entire assets in the industry.) Faced with increasingly stagnated markets in the United States, these companies, like their counterparts in Europe and Japan, seek to penetrate markets in the Third World countries.

These multinationals make their profits not on basic foodstuffs but rather on highly processed "convenience" foods sold by way of saturation advertising. This advertising seduces the poor into spending an alarming portion of their meager incomes on such nutritionally poor foods as soft drinks, cookies and chewing gum.

"In investing abroad, these firms have sought out the faster-growing convenience foods, where advertising, rather than price cutting, is the instrument of competition."

** Thomas Horst, *At Home Abroad*, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1974, p. 127.

"The principal contribution of the U.S. food industry to the diets of Latin America has been and continues to be the empty calories of Coke and Pepsi."

** Robert Ledogar, *Hungry for Profits*, New York: IDOC, 1975.

"Low-income families are seduced into spending a disproportionate amount of their income on canned baby foods and similar items at the expense of more needed staples." "Industrial processing inevitably elevates a product's cost beyond that of an equal quantity of the staple."

** Alan Berg, *The Nutrition Factor: Its Role in Development*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1973.

"The food industry in developing countries has been a disaster . . . a minus influence."

** D.B. Jelliffe, "Commerciogenic Malnutrition?" *Nutrition Reviews*, Vol. 30, No. 9, September, 1972. Dr. Jelliffe is a professor of nutrition at UCLA.

* Henry Frundt, *American Agribusiness and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1975. Good case studies of firms such as General Foods in Third World countries.

The life-threatening impact of the promotion of infant formula has been massively documented. An annotated bibliography is available through INFACT (The Newman Center, 1701 University Avenue, S.E., Minneapolis, Minnesota 55414). See also *Food First*, Chapter 37 (hb) and Chapter 38 (pb); and Chapter 9 in Ledogar's *Hungry for Profits*.

In the 1960's a number of food multinationals, often with the help of government subsidies, tried to develop, produce and market protein-rich processed foods in underdeveloped countries. But today virtually all have abandoned the effort because it was not profitable.

"In fact, the outstanding characteristic of nearly all attempts by private companies to market protein-rich foods to the poor has been their lack of success. The major reason for this is that most companies found it impossible to market protein-rich products at a price that was both low enough for people to afford and high enough for the company to make a profit."

* Robert Ledogar, *Hungry for Profits*, New York: IDOC, 1975, p. 100.

The most important motive for the companies was "corporate image."

** Alan Berg, *The Nutrition Factor*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1973.

* Elizabeth Orr, *The Use of Protein-rich Foods for the Relief of Malnutrition in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Experience*, London: Tropical Products Institute, 1972.

* David Brand, "New-Food Research Isn't Likely to Ease Poor Nations' Hunger," *Wall Street Journal*, December 18, 1974.

** Colin Tudge, "Why Turn Waste into Protein?" *New Scientist*, April 17, 1975. Discusses corporate research to develop high-protein and high-lysine crops. "... they would most likely be used to support a livestock industry whose products would be available only to the rich elite—and whose consumption of other primary feed materials would in the end possibly decrease the supply of food to the rest of the population."

3. Agribusiness operations tend to perpetuate miserable working and living conditions for their workers.

** See *Food First*, Chapters 33, 34 (hb); Chapters 35, 36 (pb).

** North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), "Bitter Fruits," Vol. 10, No. 7, September, 1976.

** Robert Ledogar, *Hungry for Profits*, Chapter 5 on Gulf and Western's sugar workers.

Third World countries can compete with one another in export markets primarily by exploiting labor, especially women and children. The corporations' need to maximize profits necessitates keeping labor costs at a minimum.

* F.H. Beck, "How agribusiness controls the production of vegetables in the North East of Mexico," *Problemas del Desarrollo*, Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas, Mexico City.

* Carlos Figueroa Ibarra, *El Proletariado Rural en el Agro Guatemalteco*, Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales, Universidad de San Carlos, Guatemala, 1976.

* Frank Ellis, *International Division of Labor: A Study of Employment in the Banana Export Industry of Panama and Central America*, Geneva: ILO, December 1977.

"Multinationals are spreading their propaganda about their supposed capability to solve the world food crisis. Food workers of developing countries have long and bitter experience of this capability. There are great numbers of agribusiness workers whose low salaries, substandard housing, poor health, and squalid working conditions are such that hunger, malnutrition, and undernourishment for them and their families are commonplace. If so many multinational firms do not even allow their own workers to feed themselves properly, how can we for a moment imagine that they can bring a decent diet to anyone?"

** Document prepared by International Union of Food Workers (IUF), a 2.6 million member organization of 125 national unions in both developed and underdeveloped countries, for the 1974 World Food Conference.

4. Agribusiness operations maintain and tend to exacerbate inequalities in control over resources.

** Gonzalo Arroyo, *Agro-Industrial Transnational Firms, Agrarian Reform and Rural Development*, University de Paris, X, June 1978.

** Robert Ledogar, *Hungry for Profits*. See especially chapter 5 on Gulf and Western in the Dominican Republic.

** Gerardo Mueller, "Campanhias Transnacionais e Desenvolvimento na Agricultura Brasileira." CEBRAP, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 1977.

** Frances Fitzgerald, "Giving the Shah Everything He Wants," *Harper's*, November, 1974.

** Lars Bondestam, "Notes on Foreign Investments in Ethiopia," in Carl Widstrand, ed., *Multinational Firms in Africa*, Africa Institute for Economic Development, Dakar, Senegal; and Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, 1975.

** Ernest Feder, *Strawberry Imperialism*, Institute for Social Studies. The Hague, Netherlands; Editorial Compesina, Mexico City, 1978.

Multinational agribusinesses have a number of built-in biases that favor larger farmers (under contract with agribusiness). For example, farmers contracting to supply multinational agribusiness are often required to put up a large portion of the working capital needed to grow the crops.

** "Mode of Transnational Corporation Impact on Agriculture and Rural Development," draft manuscript for United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations, August, 1978.

** Eleanor McCallie and Frances Moore Lappé, *The Philippines Banana Industry*, IFDP, 1977.

If the contracts mean increased income for the larger farmers, then the small farmers are likely to have their land bought out. "The aggregate result in the community will be an increase in economic inequality."

** *Evaluation of LAAD de Centroamerica: A subsidiary of Latin American Agribusiness Development Corporation*, Checchi and Company, Washington, D.C., November 23, 1977.

5. Agribusiness operations tend to be unconcerned about preserving the agricultural resources they exploit.

Their power makes it possible to move to another site. Land obtained cheaply can be treated cheaply. Wasteful and destructive use of irrigation and misuse of pesticides are especially common.

** Ernest Feder, *Strawberry Imperialism*.

** Maureen Macintosh, work cited above on Bud Senegal. See Chapter 33 (hb) and Chapter 35 (pb) in *Food First* which summarizes some Dutch and French language reports on Bud as well as on-site investigations by the Institute for Food and Development Policy.

** Jose da Veiga, "Quand les multinationales font du ranching," cited above. See also *Food First*, Chapter 6 (hb); Chapter 7 (pb), on the alarming environmental impact of agribusiness in the Amazon basis.

NON-"AID" FORMS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

Most concerned Americans believe that what they should do to end hunger is work to improve and increase official U.S. government development assistance. Such a focus is misplaced. First, official government development assistance represents only the tip of the iceberg in view of the overriding impact of other channels of U.S. economic intervention and military support.

1. **U.S. Military Assistance and Sales Programs are used to suppress indigenous resistance to regimes that deny both basic political rights and basic food rights.**

   The United States provides military assistance and sells arms to at least eight countries internationally denounced as human rights violators: Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, South Korea. U.S. military assistance and arms sales have increased five fold to the Philippines since the imposition of martial law, and in Nicaragua where widespread resistance to the Somoza dictatorship has brought down bloody repression, the National Guard has had more U.S. training than any other military or police force in the hemisphere on a per capita basis. For 1979 the State Department has requested funding for further training of the National Guard.

   ** Michael Klare, *Supplying Repression*, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1977.

   ** Michael Klare and David Volman, *Arms Trade Data*, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1978.

   ** "The Economics of Authoritarianism," *Southeast Asia Resource Center Chronicle*, Berkeley, California, November/December, 1978.

   ** John Mankoff and Christopher Pain, "Advice without Consent: The U.S. Military Abroad," *Pacific Research*, Mountain View, California: Pacific Studies Center, January/February, 1978.

** Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, "International Human Rights and the Administration's Security Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1979: A Critique," Washington, D.C., March, 1978.

2. **Security Supporting Assistance (grants for general support of the recipient's national budget) goes overwhelmingly to those countries which the U.S. policy makers judge politically significant, not to the needy.**

AID's 1979 budget requests for Security Supporting Assistance allocations to Egypt and Israel approach the combined total of all allocations for all projects in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

* *Congressional Presentation* FY 1979, U.S. AID, main volume.

3. **Export-Import Bank and Commodity Credit Corporation offer financing and loan guarantees on favorable terms to foreign purchasers of U.S. products. Support that the U.S. provides to other countries through such channels massively overshadows its support going through official development assistance.**

In 1976 ten times more support reached Latin American countries through the Export-Import Bank alone than through AID. When, in 1976, human rights protests forced the Chilean junta to reject U.S. official assistance, financing through the Export-Import Bank helped make up for the lost "aid."

** Center for International Policy, "Foreign Aid: Evading the Control of Congress" International Policy Report, Washington, D.C. Describes the various functions of all fifteen agencies through which U.S. government channels economic and military assistance.

** Center for Development Policy, *Development Finance: Guide to Overseas Lending Trade and Investment*, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C. 1978. A bi-monthly guide to investment activities of multilateral and bilateral public lending agencies, private international banks, multinational corporations and both insurance and guarantee public loan programs.

** Agency for International Development, *Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance for International Organizations: Obligations and Authorizations*, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1977, Wash., D.C.

4. **Insuring investments of U.S. corporations in the Third World against expropriation, currency incontrovertibility, war, or revolution, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation**

(OPIC), using Treasury funds, helps agribusiness get a firmer foothold in the underdeveloped countries.

Foreign agribusiness investments stand in direct opposition to the redistribution of control over resources necessary to end hunger (see Part III, pp. 40-47 ff.)

Forty-one percent of OPIC insurance issued between 1974 and 1976 has gone to only eleven of the largest U.S. multinational corporations. OPIC is not a passive insurer; it seeks out promising investments and supports feasibility studies.

** Bill Goodfellow, "OPIC: Insuring the Status Quo," *International Policy Report*, Center for International Policy, Washington, D.C., 1977.

* *OPIC Annual Reports.*

FOOD AID, A.I.D., AND THE WORLD BANK

Americans must also closely examine the impact of U.S. "aid," food aid, development assistance, and projects of the World Bank in underdeveloped countries. (The United States is the largest subscriber to the Bank and holds 23 percent of the voting power.) Such official "assistance" fails to challenge the structures which deny people control over food resources and indeed, more often than not, reinforces the position of the elites who benefit from those structures that keep the many hungry. For a general overview of U.S. foreign assistance programs:

** See *Food First* Part IX (hb and pb).

** Institute for Food and Development Policy, *The Aid Debate: Assessing the Impact of U.S. Foreign Assistance and the World Bank*, Working Paper Number One, 1979.

1. **Food Aid: While in certain emergencies and on a short-term basis, food aid can relieve suffering, the overriding impact of U.S. food aid is to exacerbate the conditions that create hunger.**

   Food aid rarely reaches the hungry. Often the reason is not simply corruption, as many Americans believe. Rather, the recipient government, quite openly, uses the food aid as a form of budgetary support and as a domestic political tool. In 1978 about two-thirds of U.S. food aid fell under Title I, in which the recipient government buys U.S. food grain on concessionary terms and then distributes it locally, often reselling it. (Title II food aid is free to the government and is usually dispensed by voluntary agencies.)

   Bangladesh is a good illustration of how U.S. food aid actu-

ally works. Ninety percent of American food aid comes to Bangladesh under Title I. The government then sells it at subsidized prices through its ration system. But the grain goes primarily to those who could best afford it at the going market price—the urban middle class, and members of the military and civil service. It is no secret that the purpose of the ration system is not to feed the hungry but to keep the politically volatile urban population content. In addition, the revenues generated through the ration system are a vital source of financial support for the government.

** See *Food First* Chapter 40 (hb); Chapter 42 (pb).

** Betsy Hartmann and Jim Boyce, "Bangladesh: Aid to the Needy?" *International Policy Report*, Center for International Policy, Washington, D.C., 1978.

* *Bangladesh: Food Policy Review*, World Bank, 1977.

** Donald F. McHenry & Kai Bird, "Food Bungle in Bangladesh," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1977, No. 27.

** See forthcoming interview with a development worker in Bangladesh to be jointly published by Oxfam and the Institute for Food and Development Policy, Fall 1979.

Even emergency programs under Title II (grants) have been diverted to serve the already well-off in many countries. When the programs are badly administered, as in the case of Ghana, a significant portion of food ends up in the hands of government officials and merchants who make certain that those in the most need are deprived of food.

** *Report on Examination of the Title II Emergency Food Program in Ghana*, Area Auditor General, Africa, Nairobi, Kenya. U.S. AID Audit Report No. 3-641-78-1 October 6, 1977.

Food aid in some cases actually undercuts the local price of grain, making it more difficult for peasant producers to earn their livelihood by selling their surplus. Thus both the livelihood of the local producers and production itself is undermined.

** *Disincentives to Agricultural Production in Developing Countries*, U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress, November 26, 1975.

** Leonard Dudley and Roger Sandilands, "The Side Effects of Foreign Aid: The Case of P.L. 480 Wheat in Colombia," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, January, 1975.

** J.S. Mann, "The Impact of Public Law 480 on Prices and Domestic Supply of Cereals in India," *Journal of Farm Economics*, Vol. 49, No. 143, 1969.

Even in cases of natural disaster, food aid can hinder recon-

struction. After the earthquake in Guatemala, for example, food aid disrupted the market for locally-produced grain so that small farmers could not earn the income needed to buy materials to rebuild their houses. In fact, many have concluded that there was *no* need for foreign food aid after the earthquake.

** Interviews with Oxfam's and World Neighbor's rural organizers in the Guatemalan highlands.

** Jo Froman, Bob Gersony, and Tony Jackson, *General Review: P.L. 480 Food Assistance in Guatemala*, Antigua, Guatemala, June 1977.

** *The Relationship Between P.L. 480 Food Distribution and Agricultural Development in Guatemala*, edited interview with Roland Bunch and William Ruddell, rural training and development field workers, Antigua, Guatemala, August 21, 1977.

** *Food Donations After Disasters and in Relation to Agricultural Development*, edited interview with Frederick C. Cuny, Executive Director, INTERTECT (Dallas, Texas) Antigua, Guatemala, February 28, 1977.

** "The Social and Economic Consequences of the P.L. 480 program in Guatemala and Haiti," interviews by Tony Jackson (available from Oxfam, 302 Columbus Avenue, Boston, Mass. 02116).

Criteria for deciding the levels and distribution of U.S. food aid is generally not the needs of the recipients but its usefulness to interests within the United States as 1) a surplus disposal mechanism to maintain U.S. farm prices, and 2) a political and even military tool.

** NACLA *Reports, "U. S. Grain Arsenal," Vol. 9, No. 7, 1975.*

** IPRA Food Group, Circular Letter IV, Jan., 1978 *Food Aid*, P.O. Box 70, 33101 Tampere 10, Finland.

** In-depth series of articles on how U.S. food aid is used to develop markets for U.S. farm commodities by Dan Morgan in the *Washington Post*, March 10-12, 1975 and July 5, 1975.

** Dan Morgan, *Merchants of Grain*, New York: Viking, 1979.

* *U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations and Loan Authorizations*, July 1945-Sept. 1976, Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State.

Canada's food aid program is similar to the U.S. Based upon the need to dispose of surplus agricultural stocks, most food aid is sold in commercial markets and never reaches those most in need of it. Canadian food aid is usually sold at less than prevailing local prices thus undercutting the domestic market for the foods from small local producers.

** Robert Carty, "Food Aid: Blessed Are The Givers," LAWG letter, Vol. V, No. 6, Toronto, Ontario M5S 2T2, Canada.

2. The United States Agency for International Development stands in the way of real development.

As an arm of the U.S. government AID will not challenge the elite groups in power in the recipient country, certainly not when those groups serve the interests of private U.S. corporations and share the political ideology of U.S. policy makers. Thus, no matter how well-intentioned certain individuals are within AID, the agency ends up serving the very national elites who stand in active opposition to the restructuring of their societies by and for the poor majority.

** See *Food First* Chapter 42 (hb); Chapter 44 (pb).

Ignoring the landless: AID has no effective strategy for the dispossessed—the landless and near landless workers, day laborers, insecure tenants, sharecroppers, and squatters—who together make up 50 to 90 percent of the rural labor force.

* Asian Development Bank, *Asian Agricultural Survey, 1978.*

* Center for International Studies, *Landlessness and Nearlandlessness in Developing Countries,* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1978.

The fallacy of a small farmer panacea: Shifting credit and agricultural inputs in the direction of small holders will not necessarily benefit them, much less the majority who are landless. The few small holders favored by an AID project usually function as the lowest strata of the rural elite—not as the leaders of fundamental change. Moreover, the prime reason small holders are poor and hungry is not that they lack inputs that AID can supply, but because they exert no economic or political power. Will increasing their output benefit them if merchants, moneylenders, and other exploiters continue to siphon off the lion's share? Without an organization of peasants able to wield political power, greater production can simply result in lower prices, with no net gain to the small producers.

** Evaluation of Haiti Small Farm Project, Development Alternatives, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1977. (Shows how increasing coffee production of small Haitian producers makes them more vulnerable rather than better off.)

* *Credit Programs For Small Farmers in Latin America Can Be Improved,* Report to the Congress by the Controller General of the United States, December 9, 1977.

** Guy Gran, *Development vs. the World System: A Model Policy Planning Country Study of Peru,* Washington, D.C.: AID, 1978.

Industrial Focus: Rhetoric about "basic needs strategy" notwithstanding, the major outlays of AID continue to be for infrastructure projects—especially roads, dams, and rural electrifica-

tion—that benefit those who already control the country's productive assets. The chief of the AID Agricultural Mission in Indonesia had to agree that the main beneficiaries of a $125 million AID electrification project would be the better-off farmers who would use the electricity to mill rice mechanically. Fewer jobs for the poor is the result.

Such infrastructure projects are often listed under the title "Food and Nutrition" in order to make the AID program look more progressive. The following outlays are listed under "Food and Nutrition":

—$100 Million "Rural Roads Phase II" in Pakistan
—$36 Million Rural Electrification in Indonesia
—$10.3 Million "Fund for Local Government" in the Philippines.

** See: *An Evaluation of the Program Performance of the International Program Division of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association* NRECA), a report prepared for the Agency for International Development by Development Alternatives, Inc., Washington, D.C. Jan. 1977. Contract No. AID/otr-C-1383, Work Order No. 19. The study also cites AID's earlier studies of electrification schemes in Costa Rica and Colombia where benefits clearly accrue to rural elites.

* *Bangladesh-Rural Electrification*, Proposal and Recommendations for the Review of the Development Loan Committee, AID Project Paper. AID-DLC/P-2232 1977.

* Preliminary Profile of Poverty in Indonesia," an annex to the *FY 1979 Annual Budget Submission to Congress*, USAID Indonesia, June 1977.

Support for Agribusiness: Part III outlined how the penetration of multinational agribusiness works against the interests of the poor. Yet AID provides loans to some of the world's largest corporations—shareholders of the Latin American Agribusiness Development Corporation (LAAD)—helping them to gain a foothold in the underdeveloped countries. By the end of 1977 LAAD had 101 agribusiness projects in Latin America, primarily for the production and export of luxury items—cut flowers and frozen vegetables, meat, and seafood. LAAD, with the help of AID's $17 million in low-interest loans, strengthens the elite with whom it enters joint ventures and reinforces the focus on export agriculture. A Washington consulting firm studying LAAD for AID concluded that LAAD's production has been "destined for upper middle, upper class consumption, or for export" and that LAAD's role has not been "to reach the small man" but to "support businessmen whose success is predictable."

** LAAD Annual Reports.

** Jack C. Corbett and Ronald J. Ivey, *Evaluation of Latin American Agribusiness*

Development Corporation, Checchi and Co., Washington, D.C. 1974, and *Evaluation of LAAD De Centroamerica, Checchi, 1977. These studies were commissioned by AID.*

AID is a political force: While AID claims political neutrality, the record shows that it has cut off funds to countries where genuine land reform is underway and has vastly increased aid to governments actively undermining the well-being of the majority, and abolishing civil liberties in order to deal with those who protest.

Chile: In 1970 when a legal government began a far reaching land reform, AID cut off support; but after one of the most repressive regimes in the hemisphere seized power in 1973, AID assistance and food aid climbed 24-fold (by 1976).

* *Overseas Grants and Loans and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations and Loan Authorizations*, USAID, July 1945-Sept. 1976.

** Joseph D. Collins, "Tightening the Financial Knot," in *Chile: The Allende Years*, New York, IDOC, 1973.

Thailand: Between 1973 and 1976 AID funds to Thailand dropped sharply as a civilian government encouraged peasants and other groups organizing for progressive reform. But after a 1976 right-wing coup brought severe repression to student, labor, and peasant groups, AID programs suddenly began to expand. AID's programs are concentrated in those provinces officially designated "sensitive" due to ongoing resistance.

Philippines: Since the imposition of martial law AID loans and grants have jumped fivefold.

** *Human Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program:* FY 1978, Part II East Asia, Center for International Policy, Washington, D.C., 1978.

** Walden Bello and Severina Rivera, eds., *The Logistics of Repression and Other Essays: The Role of U.S. Assistance in Consolidating the Martial Law Regime in the Philippines.* Washington, D.C.: Friends of the Philippino People, 1977.

3. Because it is a multilateral lending agency, the World Bank is often thought to be more impartial than an individual government. But operating as a lending agency whose dominant voting members are the major Western powers, especially the United States, the Bank's policies reflect the financial and political orientation of its major contributors.

** See *Food First* Chapter 41 (hb); Chapter 43 (pb).

Fiscal measures that penalize the poor: The World Bank is more than a provider of development loans. Along with its sister in-

stitution, the IMF, it advises governments on economic policies and helps determine their credit rating. Its requirements for a favorable investment climate—often including currency devaluation and cutbacks in social services—can spell declining real income for the lower classes. World Bank loans go overwhelmingly to governments willing to enforce such measures—some of the world's more repressive regimes. Four countries that have undergone military takeovers or martial law since the early 1970s—Argentina, Chile, the Philippines, and Uruguay—will receive a sevenfold increase in World Bank lending by 1979. Loans to all other borrowers will increase only three times.

** "World Bank Sets $2.9 Billion in Loans to Human Rights Violaters for Fiscal Year 1979," a research study published by the Center for International Policy," Washington, D.C., 1978

** Interreligious Task-Force on U.S. Food Policy, "Human Needs and the International Monetary Fund," *Food Policy Notes*, Notes 78-25, August, 1978, Washington, D.C.

** Cheryl Payer. *The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World*, London: Penguin, 1974. Explains the functions and policies of the IMF as they affect the national policy choices and well-being of the people in the underdeveloped countries. Case histories of the "stabilization programs" imposed in such countries as Indonesia, Brazil, Philippines and India.

** Walden Bello and Severina Rivera, eds., *The Logistics of Repression*, Washington, D.C.: Friends of the Philippino People, 1977.

Strengthening Rural Elites: World Bank projects ignore the fact that most Third World villages do not represent a community of common interests. Instead they are a battleground in which the few already in control of most of the land, water, and credit are poised to seize any new investment to further strengthen their own position, making the poor more dependent on them. Introducing new profit-generating investments, while opting to ignore such rural realities, means that World Bank projects undercut the very poor they claim to be helping.

** Ernest Feder, "Capitalism's Last-Ditch Effort to Save Underdeveloped Agricultures," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1977.

** Susan George, *How the Other Half Dies*, Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1977.

** Barry Newman, "In Indonesia, Attempts by the World Bank to Aid the Poor Often Go Astray," *Wall Street Journal*, November 19, 1977.

Bangladesh: The World Bank offered credit to the government of Bangladesh for 3000 deep tubewells. On paper each was to be the property of a village cooperative; in reality each was owned by one person—the richest landlord in the village, or the one

with the most political clout. With the World Bank-funded tubewell—and the profits from leasing rights to the water—the landlords are in a better position than ever to buy out the small farmers when hard times befall them.

** Betsy Hartmann and Jim Boyce, "Bangladesh: Aid to the Needy?" *International Policy Report*, Center for International Policy, Washington, D.C., 1978.

Cooperatives for the Rich: Given widespread rural inequalities, cooperatives (and "producer associations") are inevitably dominated by richer farmers. The World Bank's "integrated rural development" strategy, which focuses on channeling inputs through cooperatives, has led to wider economic disparities in countries ranging from Mexico to Bangladesh.

** The Institute for Food and Development Policy, *The Aid Debate: Assessing the Impact of U.S. Foreign Assistance and the World Bank, Working Paper No. 1*, 1979.

** UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development), *Rural Cooperatives as Agents of Change: a Research Report and a Debate*. Geneva, 1975. Studied cooperatives in a variety of countries throughout the Third World.

** Raymond Apthorpe, "The Cooperatives' Poor Harvest," *New Internationalist*, February 1977.

** United Nations Asian Development Institute, *An Approach to Micro-Level Development: Designing and Evaluation of Rural Development Projects*. Bangkok, February 1977.

Ignoring the real poor: Rhetoric about a focus on the small farmer notwithstanding, the World Bank states that half of its credit will still go to the large and medium sized farmers. And even that going to the "small" must be questioned.

Guatemala: There, the World Bank defines small as any holding of less than 112 acres; but 97 percent of the holdings in Guatemala are less than 112 acres. With such a high cut-off point, the World Bank project in Guatemala could totally bypass the real poor—farmers with only a few acres and of course the many with no land at all.

* *Draft Report of the Guatemala Agricultural Credit Project Preparation Mission*, FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program, Volume I—Main Text, FAO Rome Report No. 6/77 GUA 5, March 4, 1977 (confidential).

The Landless: Except for an occasional token project, the World Bank has no strategy to help the landless—who even by their own measures comprise 50 to 60 percent of the rural population.

* *Assault on World Poverty*, World Bank, 1975. (Here the Bank lays out its

assumptions and guidelines for rural credit programs.)

* *An Assessment of the Effectiveness of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank in Aiding the Poor*, prepared by the Congressional Research Service for the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, March 10, 1978. (Actually the report does not evaluate the impact of Bank projects. It implies an improvement in the Bank's approach to rural problems but offers no proof that Bank projects actually benefit the poor they claim in public reports to be helping.)

Focus on export crops, not food crops: Since the Bank is concerned first with getting its loans repaid with interest, it concentrates its credit on export crops. Because export crops like cotton or tobacco generally cannot be consumed by the producer, and because the processing and marketing of such crops is often centrally controlled, the Bank is more sure of a "marketable surplus" needed to repay its loan.

* World Bank, *Annual Reports*, 1972-1978.

** IFDP, Aid Debate, pg. 26.

* The predominant focus on exports is clear in the following Bank documents:
Assault on World Poverty, 1975
The World Bank in Africa, 1973
The World Bank in the Americas, 1974

Pushing Money: Lending commitments for 1979 are projected at almost $10 billion. Finding outlets for such huge sums of money is not easy. Bank officers are judged by how good they are at scaring up projects into which to channel funds—a process not conducive to reflecting on the social consequences of projects. This "excess funds syndrone," as those in the field call it, 1) launches premature large-scale projects when smaller, slower germinating projects would at least have been less harmful, 2) increases the likelihood of corruption as documented in Bangladesh and Indonesia, and 3) undercuts the efforts of small agencies trying to place strict conditions on the use of their aid in countries where the government is not on the side of the hungry.

* Interviews with those working with the Bank and with officials of voluntary agencies in the field.

* Barry Newman, "In Indonesia, Attempts by the World Bank to Aid the Poor Often Go Astray," *Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 19, 1977.

Focus on financing imports and therefore on development hardware: The World Bank was in fact chartered in large part for the purpose of financing capital goods imports from countries like the

United States. Thus "development" inevitably gets defined as things that cost lots of money and require expensive imports—buildings, foreign high-salary technicians, and the vehicles they need, dams, roads, laboratories, audio-visual equipment, and so forth.

Example of project with large "hardware" component:

- *Thailand: Appraisal of the National Agricultural Extension Project*, World Bank Report 10. 1256a–TH, March, 1977.
- Richard E. Stryker, "The World Bank and Agricultural Development," unpublished manuscript, Indiana University, Department of Political Science, April 1978.

No accountability: There is no public institution that evaluates any aspect of the performance of the Bank. Bank documents are secret. No staff member will testify before any congressional or parliamentary hearings. Accountable to no one, the Bank is free to make whatever grandiose claims it wishes about the number of people who benefit from its projects.

Additional sources on AID and the World Bank as a political force:

- Teresa Hayter, *Aid as Imperialism*, London: Penguin Books, 1971.
- Denis Goulet and Michael Hudson, *The Myth of Aid*, New York: IDOC, 1971.
- Steve Weissman, *The Trojan Horse, A Radical Look at Foreign Aid*, Berkeley, CA: Ramparts Press, 1974.
- Leon Howell, "Indonesia: Economic Prospects and the Status of Human Rights," *International Policy Report*, Center for International Policy, Washington, D.C., 1976.
- Bonnie Mass, *Population Target: The Political Economy of Control in Latin America*, Latin America Working Group, Toronto, Canada, 1976.



Peasants at Tay Bac cooperative in Vietnam bind rush to be used for furniture and mats. *Vietnam News Agency.*

PART IV

The Solution Lies in the Transformation in Control Over the Resources That Produce Food

LESSONS FROM SOCIETIES ELIMINATING HUNGER

Lessons not Models: If the root cause of hunger is identified as the inequalities in control over productive assets, then any attempt at solutions must ask first: how does it help reduce such inequalities? How can society be restructured so that all can participate in decisions on the use of productive resources and so that all can make effective demand on those resources?

We have found that the only societies in the world that seem to be effectively overcoming hunger are countries that are incorporating aspects of what Americans dismiss as "socialism." For many socialism is equated with totalitarianism and dismissed out of hand as unthinkable. Many believe that exclusively private control over resources, with economic decisions determined by the market and the minority who control resources, to be uniquely compatible with democracy. We, on the other hand, have to come to the opposite conclusion—that the highly concentrated control in economies such as ours is both inconsistent with democracy and incapable of providing food security for everyone. With this understanding, what are our options? Certainly we should not embrace wholesale an economic system developed by another people. No. But we can move ahead in trying to create a more democratic economic structure in our own country. We should work to learn all we can of the efforts, difficulties, failures, and successes of other people—people who are consciously trying to create an economic system in which all have the opportunity to participate in decisions about the use of resources and in which all are assured of food security. It is in this spirit of exploration that we put forward for discussion the following six "lessons" that must be considered from the experience of other people tackling these most fundamental issues.

** See *Food First* Part X (hb and pb).

1. **The redistribution of control over food-producing resources can result in greater food production since a) a more rational use of the land and resources is possible, and b) human energies are released when people know their labor will benefit them.**

   CUBA

   Before agrarian reform in Cuba, large sugar estates, many U.S. owned, controlled 70 to 75 percent of the arable land. Given the limited international market for sugar and domestic poverty that limited local demand, the sugar planters *kept more than half of their land idle.* What they did plant produced some of the world's lowest sugar yields. A mere 250 ranches, controlling 10

million acres, also underutilized their resources. With no conservation measures, the pastureland deteriorated rapidly and one study showed that lack of proper herd care resulted in a loss of $160 million each year.

** James O'Connor, *The Origins of Socialism in Cuba*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970.

** Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, *Socialism in Cuba*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.

** Edward Boorstein, *The Economic Transformation of Cuba*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.

VIETNAM

Moreover, when a few control most of the land, using it to bring them the greatest return, export-oriented monoculture is the rule (see Part II). After a genuine land redistribution, a diversification of crops to meet local food needs can result. In Vietnam, under French colonialism, rice alone—much of it for export—occupied over 95 percent of the cultivated area. After the defeat of the French in 1954 and land reform was undertaken, monoculture began to give way to diversified crops. By 1970, 18 percent of the land was growing crops other than rice—crops such as corn, sweet potatoes, beans, sesame seeds, and fruit.

** *Agricultural Problem: Agronomical Data*, Vietnamese Studies, Hanoi, (source recommended to the Institute by Vietnamese scholar at Harvard, Ngo Vinh Long, author of an authoritative history of Vietnam.)

** Ngo Vinh Long, *Before the Revolution: The Vietnamese Peasant Under the French*, Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1973.

** Gerard Chaliand, *Peasants of North Vietnam*, London: Penguin Books, 1968.

More comprehensive assessments are clearly needed that compare the agricultural performance of countries that have carried out major agrarian reforms with those that have not. Unfortunately we are all exposed to superficial comparisons that often fall victim to the following weaknesses: 1) underestimating the length of time necessary to overcome the legacy of the exploitative system being replaced (e.g., illiteracy, poor health, poor infrastructure, with what exists geared solely to monoculture export crops, lack of administrative experience); 2) interpreting as failures of "reform" what are really failures to carry out genuine reform (e.g., fake political reforms such as in the Philippines or India); 3) failing to take into account that more of production may be being consumed by the rural producers (and therefore escaping national production totals) because, post reform, more people have access to land; 4) attempting to

compare post reform production in countries that have been mostly self-reliant (e.g. China) with countries which have had *massive* influx of foreign capital (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan) and are therefore not realistic models.

While the pattern of post reform production is not uniform, those few comprehensive studies that do exist appear to show a relationship between the degree of genuine participation and redistribution of power during and after the reform and the success in productive terms.

GENERAL STUDIES:

** Theodor Bergman, *Farm Policies in Socialist Countries*, Lexington Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1975.

** Jack Dunman, *Agriculture—Capitalist and Socialist*. London: Lawrence and Wishard, 1975.

CHINA

China is a particularly important country to study now because of the renewed drive to increase production. Some now say that a more participatory equality-conscious economic system has failed to meet the extremely pressing production demands of one of the world's most densely populated countries; others say that genuine participation has not yet really been tried; others say that more economic democracy on the local level *has* generally succeeded in overcoming incredible obstacles to increased production, and others, that overly formalistic definitions of equality have spoiled the spirit of many to increase their productivity. In any case, there is much to learn from China.

** *Learning from China*, A Report on Agriculture and the Chinese People's Communes by an FAO Study Mission, 1977, Regional Office for Asia and the Far East, FAO, Bangkok, Thailand.

** "China: The Great Exception," in *Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia*, Keith Griffin and Azizur Khan, eds., International Labour Office, Geneva, 1978.

2. Where the land is controlled by a few, the profit from production is drained out of agriculture. Democratic participation in deciding how production will be used is the only insurance that it will benefit the producers. The "structures" for democratic participation can be created, however, yet still controlled by the old elite who remain able to drain wealth out of the peasant sector.

Vietnam: Before agrarian reform in what was North Vietnam as much as one-half to three-fourths of the value of agricultural

production was drained off by landowners and merchants for personal consumption and investment outside of agriculture. Now, after agrarian reform, what is done with the production is decided democratically by the laborers themselves. In a typical village 45 percent of the harvest is sold to the national distribution system. The money received, and the remaining 55 percent of production, are divided among the villagers as wages, invested in village improvements, and used to buy fertilizers and to provide social and medical care.

** Kathleen Gough, *Ten Times More Beautiful: Rebuilding the Republic of Vietnam*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978. Dr. Gough is an anthropologist with 30 years experience.

China: Before the restructuring of control over the land in China, the demands of landlords, moneylenders, merchants, and government officials consumed about one quarter of the national income.

** Leon Stover, *The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization: Peasants and Elites in the Last of the Agrarian States*. New York: New American Library, 1974.

Tanzania: Structures for democratic participation in self-government appear to be dominated by a bureaucratic elite. Thus the gap between urban and rural living standards is severe and production reflects the fact that peasants have difficulty believing that their work will benefit them.

** For sources, see page 67.

3. **Land redistribution alone is not adequate. Peasants must be a motive force behind the land reform, and must organize to protect their ongoing interests.**

South Korea: The South Korean reform ended tenancy, at least in theory, by giving small amounts of land to former tenants. But rich peasants illegally retained large holdings. Moreover, credit systems, marketing, and irrigation were not reorganized co-operatively to meet the needs of the new small holders. There existed no mechanism for the poorer peasants to overcome the privileges clung to by the rural elites. The results twenty years later are predictable: by 1970, 54 percent of those farmers who had received land under the reform had become tenants again.

** *Captives on the Land, Report of a Consultation on Land*, Colombo, February, 1976, Christian Conference on Asia-Urban Rural Mission Office, 2-3-18 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160, Japan.

North Korea: In contrast to the south, North Korea has adopted a radically different approach. Two books which are useful in comparing the north with the south are:

** Ellen Brun and Jacques Hersh, *Socialist Korea: A Case Study in the Strategy of Economic Development*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.

** W. Rosenberg, *Korea Teaches the World*, forthcoming, by professor of economics at University of Canterbury, New Zealand.

Taiwan: During Taiwan's land redistribution (1949-53), the peasants remained passive recipients while the government mediated between them and the landlords. The land reform did not give birth to independent peasant organizations able to look out for their own interests. The post-reform era, therefore, left Taiwanese peasants at the mercy of their new exploiter—the state. Twelve years after the reform the land tax more than tripled while the price of rice increased less that 20 percent.

** Huang Shu-min, *Agricultural Degradation: Changing Community Systems in Rural Taiwan*, dissertation, Michigan State University, Department of Anthropology, East Lansing, Michigan, 1977.

* Benedict Stavis, *Rural Local Governance and Agricultural Development in Taiwan, Rural Development Center*. Ithaca, New York: Center for International Studies, 1974.

See forthcoming special issue of *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* on Taiwan.

Unfortunately few critical appraisals of agricultural development in Taiwan and South Korea are now available. In 1980, therefore, the Institute hopes to publish a study on each country now being undertaken by Fellows of the Institute.

4. Cooperative work can maximize use of resources.

Especially in populous Asia, cooperative work can avoid the fragmentation of land into tiny parcels, too small for the economic use of farming equipment.

An example of maximization of resources made possible by cooperative decision making can be found in a study of the village of Vu Thang in Vietnam.

In contrasting this typical rice-growing village with a comparable one in India, it was found that the Vietnamese village required 50 percent fewer pumpsets to irrigate 42 percent more land than did the Indian village. Vu Thang's pumps were more efficiently used in part because their location was determined by the cooperative, based on maximum irrigation potential. The privately owned pumps in the Indian village were, by contrast, located to benefit only the owners, who often diverted water from others into their own fields. In India the officials find it

difficult to move an embankment or channel even one foot in order to improve irrigation because they cannot obtain permission from the numerous village owners.

** Kathleen Gough, *Ten Times More Beautiful*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978.

The transformation of the Chinese village of Tachai from a mountainous wasteland to a surplus producer of food demonstrates the productive power vested in collective work. Villagers joined the cooperative once they discovered that yields were lower on their private plots which were often fragmented and therefore inefficiently operated.

Cooperative agricultural organizations create the context in which the improvement and reclamation of land can be a high priority without undercutting the individual well-being of farmers.

** Neville, Maxwell, "Learning from Tachai," *World Development* Vol. 3, Nos. 7 and 8, (July/August), 1975.

* Benedict Stavis, *Making Green Revolution: The Politics of Agricultural Development in China*, Cornell University, Rural Development Monograph No. 1, Ithaca, New York, 1974.

5. Cooperative work cannot be forced but must move forward as more and more people come to realize its advantages.

China and Vietnam: In both China and Vietnam, the movement toward cooperative work passed through several stages. By 1956 in Vietnam, half of the peasants belonged to labor-pooling groups and mutual aid groups. The movement toward cooperative control passed through four states of organization. It was not until the mid-sixties that most cooperatives actually pooled land and determined the individual's income by his or her work. By 1967, 90 percent of the cropland was worked cooperatively.

** Theodor Bergmann, *Farm Policies in Socialist Countries*, Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath & Co., 1975.

** A. Z. M. Obaidullah Khan, "The Three Great Struggles in the Chinese Countryside: A Case Study," *Bangladesh Development Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 2-3, 1976.

** Jan Myrdal, *Report from a Chinese Village*, New York: Vintage, 1965.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: The agrarian policies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are extremely varied. For some, such as Yugoslavia and Poland, the rush to implement agricultural cooperatives by the state did not work well. By the

early 1950's both Yugoslavia and Poland had abandoned co-operatives and returned to small scale private farming. In Poland, the government sought to encourage the development of "agricultural circles" in which private small holders could pool their resources on a short term basis but retain ownership and control of their property. Farms are protected by a ceiling on the amount of land one person can hold.

** Jack Dunman, *Agriculture—Capitalist and Socialist.* London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975.

** Theodor Bergmann, *Farm Policies in Socialist Countries,* Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1975.

Soviet Union: Most land is either part of a cooperative or state farm. Household plots of from 0.6 to 1.2 acres still play a significant role in the production of certain agricultural commodities. Soviet agriculture still seems to be having problems due in large part to the top-down forced collectivization efforts of the 1920's and 1930's as well as the neglect of the agricultural sector in favor of industrialization.

** Theodor Bergmann, *Farm Policies in Socialist Countries.*

* Alec Nove, "Soviet Grain—Problems and Prospects," Food Policy V. 1 No. 1, November 1975 (IPC, 32 High Street, Guilford, Surrey England GU1 3EW).

** Jack Dunman, *Agriculture—Capitalist and Socialist,* London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975.

* Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the U. S. S. R.,* London: Allenlane, 1969.

Hungary: Two-thirds of agricultural production comes from large-scale farms, cooperatives, and State farms, and one-third from small holdings, usually worked by families. Bulgaria, in contrast, is integrating large scale cooperatives with agro-industrial enterprises.

* Istvan Lazar, "Hungary's Hardy Farmers," *Atlas World Press Review,* August, 1977.

** Jack Dunman, *Agriculture—Capitalist and Socialist,* London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975.

* Alec Nove, "Can Eastern Europe Feed Itself?" *World Development,* Vol. 5, Nos. 5-7, pp. 417-424, 1977.

German Democratic Republic: The development of cooperatives began with the Land Reform of 1945. All peasants received up to 20 acres from the expropriated landed estates of eastern Germany (the landlords had been some of the most loyal to the Third Reich). During the early 1950's a voluntary program of building cooperative farms was begun. Farmers could choose to

keep their land and livestock or they could join a cooperative. Three types of cooperatives were established based upon the extent of the pooling arrangements (from pooling land to pooling all land, livestock, and machinery). The agreements between farmers and the cooperatives were voluntary with a great deal of solicitude for each person's right to his or her private property. Peasants could withdraw from a cooperative, but, according to some observers, few chose to do this because it was more profitable to remain in the cooperative than to farm a private 20 acre plot. Current estimates are that over 85% of the land is cooperatively worked and over 90% of the agricultural labor force works within cooperatives.

** Jack Dunman, *Agriculture—Capitalist and Socialist.*

** Theodor Bergmann, *Farm Policies in Socialist Countries.*

Tanzania and Mozambique: Many studies are indicating that the top-down bureaucratic style of decision-making in Tanzania, including coercing people, even forcing them to live in villages, is undermining the potential for the genuine development of self-initiated cooperative work. Mozambique, a much newer country, appears to be taking a more voluntary, slower road to villagization and cooperative work. Learning much more about these two countries may well teach valuable lessons about both the approach to and the pace of the development of cooperation.

** Frances Moore Lappé and Adele Beccar-Varela, *The Challenge of People-Based Development: Contrasting Impressions of Agricultural Development in Tanzania and Mozambique.* Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1979.

** Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul, *Socialism in Tanzania,* East Africa Publishing House, 1972.

** Andrew Coulson, "Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania," *Review of African Political Economy* No. 10, Sept.-Dec. 1977. Includes extensive list of references on Tanzania.

** Allen Isaacman, *A Luta Continua.* Fernando Brandel Center for the Study of Economics, Historical Systems, and Civilizations, State University of New York at Binghamton, NY 13901, 1978. Excellent summary of Mozambique since liberation.

** P. L. Raikes, "Ujamaa and Rural Socialism," *Review of African Political Economy,* No. 3, May-October, 1975.

** Issa G. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania,* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.

6. **Building a society where everyone has access to adequate food requires coordinated social planning.**

Social planning need not mean authoritarian rule from the top.

In fact, effective social planning can only result from the decentralization of authority that allows each region to work out appropriate solutions. The Chinese call this "from the people/to the people" social planning. National planning can establish consumer and producer prices that stimulate production, avoid speculation, and protect the food security of all.

** John Gurley, *China's Economy and the Maoist Strategy*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.

** Joseph B.W. Kuitenbrouwer, *Self-Reliance Without Poverty*, U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand, 1976.

** *Towards Socialist Planning*, Uchumi Editorial Board, ed., Tanzania Publishing House, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

7. **Technology can further human welfare only after the control over productive assets has been redistributed and when conscious, participatory planning directs its use.**

Technologies that had a negative impact in other countries (see Part II) help to solve problems in China.

** H.V. Henle, *Report on China's Agriculture*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., Rome, 1974.

** Erich Jacoby, *The Green Revolution in China*, Geneva: UNRISD, 1973.

* Sterling Wortman, "Agriculture in China," *Scientific American*, June 1975, Vol. 232, No. 6. Evidence for how the Chinese developed their own "Green Revolution."

* Benedict Stavis, *Agricultural Mechanization in China*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1979.

THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF AMERICANS:

In other Institute publications we address in much more depth what we have come to view as appropriate action responses, those reflecting the root causes outlined in this pamphlet. Please refer to Chapter 48 (hb) and Chapter 50 (pb) *Food First* and the resource list following these chapters.

Now in preparation at the Institute is a complete action guide that includes not only a selected list of critical issues and action groups but also approximately a dozen case studies—interviews with individuals about why they chose the work they are doing, its strengths and pitfalls. This pamphlet, scheduled for publication in the fall of 1979, is tentatively entitled "What Can We Do? An Action Guide on World Hunger and Rural Poverty."

Here we would simply wish to lay out the three types of action

that appear to follow from the analysis laid out in this resource guide. When we ask "what are the solutions?" the assumption seems to be that *we* have to start the search. Actually, in every country where there is hunger, ordinary people are working to gain their rightful control over food-producing resources. Our role is not to go into other countries and "set things right." Instead, we must:

1. Remove obstacles reinforced by the U.S. government and corporate interventions abroad. The appropriate work for Americans concerned about world hunger is to remove those obstacles to self-determination and self-reliance, especially those obstacles being built by U.S. based corporations and by the U.S. government through military assistance, economic "aid," and incentives for corporate penetration of the economies of the poor countries. Through these channels the U.S. government bolsters the elites abroad who resist the changes necessary to end hunger. *We, as Americans, have the responsibility and the power to halt these forces.*

2. Work here to create a democratic economic system. We must join with others here at home working to transform our economic system into a democratic one accountable to the needs of all. Our work here at home is critical not only for our own sake and for future generations. Ultimately the U.S. government's role in exacerbating the causes of hunger abroad will not end until we as a people build an economic system here in which the majority of people can assume ever greater responsibility for decisions affecting their well-being and in which a democratic planning process insures the security of all.

3. Support progressive movements. Since in every country where people are hungry men and women are already working to achieve self-determination and self-reliance, we can devise direct channels through which to support their initiatives. Material support to such indigenous groups already working in their own villages, using local organizers, and starting with the most immediate problems of their people appears to be the only kind of appropriate "aid," although it is often very difficult to offer without endangering the very groups one intends to help.

Appendix

The following are the names and addresses of the organizations and publications cited in the *Food First Resource Guide*. By writing directly to the source you can get the documents cited in this publication.

American Journal of Agricultural Economics (formerly *Journal of Farm Economics*)
Department of Agricultural Economics
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14580

Africa (Journal of the International African Institute)
10-11 Fetter Lane
London EC4 England

Africa Institute for Economic Development and Planning
P.O. Box 3186
Dakar, Senegal
West Africa

African Development
Gemini News Service Ltd.
Wheatsheaf House
Carmelite Street
London, EC4 England

Africa News: Weekly Digest of African Affairs
P.O. Box 3851
Durham, NC 27702

The African Review
East African Literature Bureau
P.O. Box 30022
Nairobi, Kenya
Africa

African Studies Review
African Studies Association
Epstein Service Building
Brandeis University
Waltham, MA

Africa Today
Center in International Race Relations
University of Denver
Denver, CO 80201

Agro-Economic Survey
16 Jalan Salemba Raya
P.O. Box 410 Jakarta, Indonesia

Asian Cultural Forum on Development (ACFOD)
Room 201 399/1 Soi Siri
Off Silom Road
Bangkok 5, Thailand

Asian Agricultural Survey
Asian Development Bank
P.O. Box 789
Manila 2800, Philippines

Bangladesh Development Studies
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies
Adamjee Court
Motijheel Commercial Area
Dacca-2, Bangladesh

Brookings Institute
1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, D.C.

Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars
P.O. Box W
Charlemont, MA 01339

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
Land Tenure Studies
122 Bank Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1A OG4 Canada

Development Finance
Center for Development Policy
401 C Street, NE
Washington, DC 20002

Center for International Policy
122 Maryland Ave. NE
Washington D.C. 20002

CIDA
See Canadian International Development Agency

Corporate Data Exchange
198 Broadway Room 706
New York, NY 10038

Developpement et Civilisation
No. 49 Rue de la Glaciers
Paris, 13E France

Economic Development and Cultural Change
University of Chicago Press
5801 Ellis Ave.
Chicago, IL 60637

Economic and Political Weekly
Skylark 284
Frere Road
Bombay, India 400 038

Economic Research Journal
University of the East
Manila, Philippines

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Via delle Terme di Caracalle
00100 Rome, Italy

Food Monitor
P.O. Box 1975
Garden City, NY 11530

Food Policy Notes
Interreligious Task Force on U.S. Food Policy
110 Maryland Ave. NE
Washington, D.C. 20002

Foreign Affairs
P.O. Box 1891
Baltimore, Maryland 21203

Friends of the Filipino People
553 30th Street
Oakland, CA 94609

GATT-Fly
600 Jarvis Street
Toronto, Ontario M4Y 2J6
Canada

Global One
United Nations Development Program
United Nations Plaza
New York, NY

IDAC
27 Chemin des Crets
1218 Grand Saconnex
Geneva, Switzerland

Institute for Independent Social Journalism
P.O. Box 174
Old Chelsea Station
New York, NY 10011

Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)
1901 Que Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20009

Institute for Social Studies
Badhuisweg No. 251
The Hague
Netherlands

Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales
Universidad de San Carlos
Guatemala City, Guatemala C.A.

Instituto Latin Americano de Estudios Transnacionales (ILET)
Apartado 85-025
Mexico 20, D.F.
Mexico

Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility
475 Riverside Drive Room 566
New York, NY 10027

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
See World Bank

International Labour Organization
CH 1211 Geneva
Switzerland

International Planned Parenthood Federation
105 Madison Ave.
New York, NY

International Rice Research Institute
P.O. Box 583
Manila, Philippines

International Union of Nutritional Sciences (IUNS)
c/o Institute of Clinical Nutrition
Sahlgren's Hospital
413 45 Gothenburg, Sweden

INTERTECT
P.O. Box 10502
Dallas, TX 75207

IPRA Food Group (International Peace Research Association)
c/o Erklarung von Bern
Gartenhofstrasse 27
8004 Zurich, Switzerland

Journal of Contemporary Asia
P.O. Box 49010
Stockholm 49, Sweden

Journal of Farm Economics
See *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*

Journal of Modern African Studies
Cambridge University Press
32 E. 57th Street
New York, NY 10022

Latin America Newsletters Ltd.
90-93 Cowcross Street
London EC1M 6BL England

U.S. Subscription:
Terry Thometz
2901 18th Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20009

Latin American Working Group-*LAWG Letter*
P.O. Box 2207, Station P
Toronto, Ontario M5S 2T2
Canada

Library of Congress Publications
Washington, D.C. 20540

Massey-Ferguson Corporation
200 University Ave.
Toronto, Ontario M5H 3E4
Canada

Mechanization and Employment in Agriculture
ILO Publications
International Labor Office
CH-1211 Geneva 22
Switzerland

Le Monde Diplomatique
5 Rue des Italiens
Paris, 9E France

Monthly Review
62 West 14th Street
New York, NY 10011

New Internationalist
62a High Street
Wallingford, Oxfordshire
OX10 OEE
England

(for U.S. subscriptions)
c/o New World Coalition
Room 209
419 Boylston Street
Boston, MA 02116

New Scientist
128 Long Avenue

London, WC2
England

North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
P.O. Box 57 Cathedral Station
New York, NY 10025

Nutrition Review
888 17th Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20006

Overseas Development Council
1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20036

Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
1129 20th Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20527

Oxfam-America
302 Columbus Avenue
Boston, Mass. 02116

Pacific Studies Center *(Pacific Research)*
867 West Dana Street No. 204
Mountain View, California 94041

Population Studies
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2 England

Review of African Political Economy
(Merlin Press)
Sufference Wharf, 2-4 West Ferry Road
London E-14, England

Sahel Bibliographic Bulletin
c/o Sahel Documentation Center
Michigan State University Libraries
East Lansing, Michigan

Scandinavian Institute of African Studies
PO Box 62
S-101 20 Stockholm, Sweden

Southeast Asia Resource Center
(publishes the *S.E. Asia Chronicle)*
PO Box 4000D
Berkeley, California 94704

Transnational Institute
(See Institute for Policy Studies)

Tropical Products Institute
Ministry of Overseas Development
56 Gray's Inn Road
London, England WC1

Union of Radical Political Economists (URPE)
(publishes URPE *Review)*
2503 Student Activities Building
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104

UN Asian Development Institute
PO Box 2-136
Bangkok, Thailand

United Nations Center Against Apartheid
United Nations Plaza
New York, NY

UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Palais des Nations
CH-1211
Geneva, Switzerland

UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
United Nations Building
Rajadamnern Avenue
Bangkok, Thailand

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)
Palais des Nations
CH-1211 Geneva,
Switzerland

United States Agency for International Development

Department of State
Washington, D.C.

United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA)
Economic Research Service
Washington, D.C. 20250

US Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

World Bank (International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development)
1818 H Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433

US National Center for Health
Statistics
Rockville, MD 20850

World Development
Pergamon Press Inc.
Maxwell House
Fairview Park
Elmsford, NY 10523

World Neighbors
5116 North Portland
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73112

For a general listing of organizations and resources see:

World Food Crisis: An Informational Directory
International Directory of Organizations and Information Resources
Public Affairs Clearinghouse
PO Box 30
Claremont, California 91711

Publications Organizations

To link up with the food network write to these activist groups for more information or sample copies of their publications:

Agribusiness Accountability Project—East, 1000 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20007. Now completing a book on U.S. agricultural policy.

Agribusiness Accountability Project—West, PO Box 5646, San Francisco, CA 94101.

Publications: *AgBiz Tiller* (monthly) and occasional studies including *The Fields Have Turned Brown* on U.S. food and agricultural policy. Order from West Coast office.

Agricultural Resources Center, PO Box 646, Chapel Hill, NC 27514. Education on the causes of hunger with special focus on the American South.

Asian Action, Newsletter of the Asian Cultural Forum on Development, Room 201, 399/1 Soi Siri, off Silom Road, Bangkok-5, Thailand.

Bread for the World, 207 East 16th Street, New York, NY 10003.
Publication: Newsletter. Christian citizens' lobby on hunger issues.

Center for Rural Affairs, PO Box 405, Walthill, Nebraska 68087.
Publication: Newsletter, *New Land Review* and research studies.

Center for Science in the Public Interest, 1757 S Street NW, Washington, DC 20009.
Publication: *Nutrition Action*. Sponsors of Food Day.

Ceres, FAO Review on Development, UNIPUB, 650 First Avenue, PO Box 433, Murray Hill Station, New York, NY 10016.

Community Nutrition Institute, 1910 K Street NW, Washington, DV 20006.
Publication: *Community Nutrition Institute Weekly Report*.

Earthwork—Center for Rural Studies, 3410 19th Street, San Francisco, CA 94110.
Bibliography available of educational material they distribute. Also, a guide for films on food and agriculture.

Economic Development Bureau, 234 Colony Road, New Haven, CT 06511. An alternative consulting service putting people with technical skills in touch with progressive Third World groups.

Food Co-op Directory, 106 Girard SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87106.
Publication: *Food Co-op Directory*. A listing of over 2300 U.S. and Canadian food co-ops, food distribution organizations and resource groups.

Ideas and Action, Action for Development, FAO, 00100 Rome, Italy.

Institute for Food and Development Policy, 2588 Mission Street, San Francisco, CA 94110.

Institute for Local Self-Reliance, 1717 18th Street NW, Washington, DC 20009.
Publication: *Self-Reliance*.

Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, 475 Riverside Drive, Room 566, New York, NY 10027.
Film: *Bottle Babies* (on infant formula-induced malnutrition in underdeveloped areas).

International Bulletin, PO Box 4400, Berkeley, CA 94704.
Bi-weekly publication on international affairs.

Latin America and Latin America Economic Report, Latin American Newsletters Ltd., 90-93 Cowcross Street, London EC1M 6BL, England.

National IMPACT, 110 Maryland NE, Washington, DC 20002.
Publication: *Hunger* (prepared by Interreligious Taskforce on U.S. Food Policy).

National Catholic Rural Life Conference, 4625 N.W. Beaver Drive, Des Moines, IO 50322.
Publication: *Catholic Rural Life*.

National Land for People, 1759 Fulton, Fresno, CA 93701.
Publications: *People, Land, Food* (monthly), *Who Owns the Land* (monograph).

New Internationalist, published in England but subscribe through the New World Coalition, Room 209, 409 Boylston Street, Boston, MA 02116.

North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), Box 57, Cathedral Station, New York, NY 10025.
Publication: NACLA's *Report*.

Oxfam America, PO Box 288, Boston, MA 02116.
Sponsors self-help projects domestically and in the Third World.

World Hunger Year (WHY), PO Box 1975, Garden City, Long Island, NY 11530.
Publication: *Food Monitor*. Education on hunger issues, specializing in media outreach.



NOW IN PAPERBACK FROM BALLANTINE BOOKS

FOOD FIRST:

Beyond the Myth of Scarcity

Frances Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins

with Cary Fowler

Revised and Updated

$2.75

During its six hardcover printings *FOOD FIRST* has become an international reference point in virtually any discussion about the issue of hunger. Referred to as "illuminating" in a *New York Times* editorial, *FOOD FIRST* consists of 50 of the most urgent questions about the causes and remedies to world hunger—and 50 responses in which the authors draw upon a world-wide network of research.

Now completely revised and updated, *FOOD FIRST* is a must for classroom teachers, church organizations and food activists. It has been translated into French, German, Swedish and Spanish.

Ask your local bookstore or food cooperative to order *FOOD FIRST*. Write to Ballantine Books, 201 East 50th Street, New York, NY 10022 for more information. (Note: The Institute will not be distributing the paperback edition).

"A major achievement!"—*The Washington Post*

"A well-documented, persuasive work . . . an important book. I hope every member of Congress will read it."—*The Baltimore Sun*

ifdp PUBLICATIONS

NEW

Agrarian Reform and Counter-Reform in Chile
by Joseph Collins

20 pages, with photographs
Single copy $1.00
7-49 copies ..... $ .75
50 or more copies ..... $ .60

The author examines the development of agrarian reform under the Christian Democrats in the 1960s, the Popular Unity government in the 1970s and the counter-reforms of the current Pinochet junta.

Based upon his extensive research and travels to Chile, Joseph Collins skillfully weaves a compelling portrait of life today in the Chilean countryside. He discusses the human toll exacted by the policies inspired by the Milton Friedman school of economics, the same policies often advocated for U.S. agriculture. An important contribution to our understanding of the Chilean reality, this report is a useful case study for all Americans concerned about world hunger.

Needless Hunger:
Voices from a Bangladesh Village
Betsy Hartmann and James Boyce

72 pages, with photographs
Single copy $3.00
7-49 copies $2.25
50 or more..... $1.80

Many who read *Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity* find among its most shocking revelations that Bangladesh is *not* a hopeless basket-case—neither now nor in the future.

Indeed Bangladesh is among the agriculturally richest countries in the world, despite its current low yields.

Many want to know more about Bangladesh, asking why such hunger and suffering amidst such abundance.

To answer that question, Betsy Hartmann and James Boyce, two Bengali-speaking Americans and Fellows of the Institute for Food and Development Policy, draw us into the daily struggles of many Bangladeshi villagers. The authors, who lived in Bangladesh for two years and in one village for nine months, cut through the paradox of needless hunger to its often brutal political and economic roots. We learn how *we* are directly linked to the very forces that generate hunger in Bangladesh.

FOOD FIRST Slide Show
30 minutes with tape narration;
270 slides;
also available in filmstrip.

Why hunger? Isn't our food supply dependent on the efficiency of giant agribusiness operations? *Are* there any solutions? What *can* we do? The *Food First* slide show powerfully confronts these tough questions.

Numerous examples drawn from the United States and around the globe dramatically depict how problems associated with "underdevelopment" in the Third World are reaching crisis proportions in the industrial countries. Solutions? They are not sought in perfect models elsewhere but in weighing lessons from societies eliminating hunger. Action? The viewer is offered a framework for action that stresses our work here to remove the obstacles in the way of genuine food security here *and* abroad.

The *Food First* slide show is global in its sweep, concrete in its

examples and recommendations.

The program is divided into four parts. It can be shown continuously in 30 minutes or broken up for discussion after each part, or in the middle.

An accompanying study guide offers:

- —a "pre-test" of ten questions viewers can ask themselves to assess their own prior assumptions;
- —a complete script with appropriate documentation;
- —recommended sources for further study;
- —suggestions for action.

Write to the Institute for information on purchase prices for the slide and filmstrip programs.

World Hunger: Ten Myths
Frances Moore Lappé
and Joseph Collins
co-authors of *Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity*
Now completely revised and updated

72 pages, with photographs

Single copy	$2.25
7-49 copies	$1.75
50 or more	$1.50

- Every country in the world has resources necessary for its people to free themselves from hunger.
- Food security cannot be measured in grain reserves nor production figures.
- A nation's per capita food production can increase and yet more people can be more hungry.
- Official foreign development assistance can contribute to the increased impoverishment of the very groups it claims to be helping most.

Do any of these statements surprise you? Then you will want to join the millions who have read earlier editions of this booklet. This new edition of *World Hunger: Ten Myths* draws on concrete examples from around the world. Its analysis is hard-hitting yet hopeful. By burying the ten most paralyzing "hunger myths," *World Hunger: Ten Myths* clears the way for each of us to work in appropriate ways to end needless hunger.

World Hunger: Ten Myths is vital reading for students, teachers, study groups, journalists and activists.

WHAT CAN WE DO?:
A Guide to Self-Education and Action on Food and Land
By William Valentine and
the Staff of the Institute for
Food and Development Policy

Available fall, 1979.

"I want to help end world hunger, now. What can I do?" is one of the most frequent questions asked of the Institute for Food and Development Policy. *What Can We Do?* will help to answer that question.

What Can We Do? offers:

- —a framework for weighing alternative choices of action;
- —personal case studies of individuals and groups who are working to end world hunger;
- —a compendium of critical issues with lists of selected action organizations;
- —suggested readings for on-going self-education.

What Can We Do? provides the reader with guidelines for moving from paralysis to action on eradicating world hunger.

PUBLICATIONS

NEW ifdp

50

CURRENT PUBLICATIONS

REPRINT PACKET NO. 1

This 16-page booklet is a collection of some of the best published articles by Institute staff members appearing in such periodicals as *The Washington Post, In These Times* and *Food Monitor.*

Single copies: $1.50
Ten or more: $1.00 each

REPRINTS OF OTHER ARTICLES

"Still Hungry After All These Years," Joseph Collins and Frances Moore Lappé, *Mother Jones,* August, 1977. This 6-page article dramatically depicts how multi-national food firms move into underdeveloped countries in search of cheap labor and land with which to grow luxury crops for export.

Single Copies: .50
Ten or more: .30 each

"Self-Reliance for a Small Planet," an interview with Frances Moore Lappé. The author of *Diet for a Small Planet* tells informally why she chose to focus on world food problems. She explains some of the basic premises of *Food First* in a conversational style.

Single copies: .50
Ten or more: .30 each

"Population Control or *Food First?*" by Peter Huessy plus *"Food First* Revisited," by Frances Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins. This critique of *Food First* by the senior researcher with the Environmental Fund and the *Food First* authors' response, both reprinted from *Ag World* (January/February, 1978), shed light on the critical issues at stake and show how they can be distorted.

Single copies: $1.00
Ten or more: .60 each

RESEARCH REPORTS

"Infant Formula Promotion and Use in the Philippines," Frances Moore Lappé and Eleanor McCallie, July, 1977.

Single copy: $2.00

"The Banana Industry in the Philippines: An Informal Report," Frances Moore Lappé and Eleanor McCallie, July, 1977.

Single copy: $3.00

To order any Institute for Food and Development Policy publications add 10 percent (for postage and handling) to the total price and make your check payable to:

The Institute for Food and Development Policy
2588 Mission Street
San Francisco, California 94110